Being a professor in 2016

Reflections on a profession in a changing world

Herman De Dijn

Irina Veretennicoff

Dominique Willems (et al.)

Being a professor in 2016
Reflections on a profession in a changing world

WK

KVAB Press

KVAB Press

Being a professor in 2016
Reflections on a profession in a changing world

Yvan Bruynseraede
Herman De Dijn
Dirk Van Dyck
Irina Veretennicoff
Frank Willaert
Dominique Willems
Jacques Willems

Contents

Preface

Series Position Papers of the Academy

The series Position Papers, called "Standpunten", of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Sciences and the Arts, hereafter referred to as "the Academy" or with the acronym "KVAB", aims at contributing to the scientific debate on current social and artistic issues in Flanders and elsewhere. The authors, members and working groups of the Academy are writing in their own name, independently and in full intellectual freedom. The approval of the publication by at least one but often more Classes of the Academy guarantees the quality of the published studies.

This particular position paper has been approved by the four Classes of the KVAB, i.e. the Class of Humanities (21 November 2015), the Class of the Arts (20 January 2016), the Class of Technical Sciences (21 January 2016) and the Class of Natural Sciences (9 March 2016).

"Being a professor in 2016"

After the fundamental changes the university experienced over the last two decades in terms of education, research, and management, it is wise to reflect on how these changes impacted on the professorial profession. The work of an academic has indeed gone through a particularly swift evolution, the possible side effects of which, however, having not always been well thought through. This evolution also went mostly unnoticed by the general public which perceives a professor as someone with a fixed career path, a nice salary, someone who teaches (in general not too much) at a university and who enjoys yearly three months' vacations.

But in reality things are quite a bit more complex. We do not want to nostalgically linger on the 'good old times' or challenge the unique attraction of being a university professor. After all, professors passionately fulfil their multiple tasks and are not afraid of a huge workload. They are also willing to creatively serve society's needs with vision and reflection. Universities should, however, remain places where knowledge is created and communicated at the highest intellectual level to serve knowledge for its own sake as well as society. One cannot help but wonder if today all conditions are sufficiently met to realise this objective.

Recent studies indicate that although the New Public Management (NPM) business model applied to the administration and financing of universities did entail positive effects – such as more effective management of people and means, increased research funding and a higher international exposure - it also led to excessive

pressure to perform, too much competitiveness, and increased bureaucracy. It also threatens to result in a breach in the relation of trust between professors and their institution. Their core tasks also changed, focus having switched from actual teaching to research and administration/management.

Meanwhile, the academic world has become very much aware of this problem, as we can see from several opinion pieces and articles[1], forums on social media, symposia and surveys. In 2013 alone, the *Actiegroep Hoger Onderwijs* ('Action Group Higher Education') was established, the 12th Ethical Forum of the University Foundation on *"The academic's burden. The university professor under perverse pressure?"* was held and the Itinera Institute provided an analysis on "*Hoger Onderwijs in tijden van massificatie: de werkvloer van docenten trekt aan de alarmbel: meer kwaliteit, minder kwantiteit is nodig*" ('Higher education in times of massification: professors sounding the alarm bell: more quality, less quantity is needed'). Unsurprisingly, certain developments are not perceived as equally problematic in all disciplines (least of all by certain established professors).

The KVAB has been worried for several years already about how the task of a professor is evolving. During the December 2010 General Meeting, the then chairwoman already tackled this problem (Willems 2010). A working group, also including members of the Jonge Academie ('Young Academy') and of the Koninklijke Academie voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde ('Royal Academy of Dutch Language and Literature') was set up in 2014 to reflect not only upon the existing difficulties, but also and specifically upon the underlying reasons and possible solutions. This position paper is the result of these reflections. Herman De Dijn, its editor, was assisted by Irina Veretennicoff and Dominique Willems and by the working group members cited at the end of this text.

November 2015

---

[1] See e.g. an article in the Belgian newspaper De Standaard (21 December 2015): "Professoren hekelen personeelsbeleid aan unief" ('Professors denounce universities' human resource management'): www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20151221_02031187 (consulted 25 March 2016). For other articles and opinion pieces, see further footnotes.

1. Introduction

Since the 1980s, universities, and actually all public institutions, were subjected to the new public management (NPM) policy, with Great-Britain leading the way and other countries such as The Netherlands, Germany and Belgium (Flanders) following suit (Ferlie 1997; Hood & Peeters 2004; de Boer, Enders & Schimank 2007; Schimank 2005), thus dramatically changing the nature of the university. But certain transformations (e.g. the massification of higher education) had been implemented well before the eighties, discrediting the idyllic picture of the autonomous, elitist Humboldtian or Newmanian university (Collini 2012, ch.3; De Ridder-Symoens 2006). The NPM policy did not only affect universities, it also influenced other public sectors and institutions, such as health care and hospitals, public media, spatial planning, museums and other cultural institutions, et cetera. The implementation of NPM policy is itself closely related to the massive public funding of those sectors and institutions (Schimank 2005: 362).

Studies indicate that the increase of public funding of higher education initially served two purposes: the democratisation of university education on the one hand, the contribution to economic growth expected from universities on the other (not unrelated to the emergence of knowledge economy). Regional (and even transnational) networks were created between (often new) universities and colleges that were supposed to help achieve these goals. Universities were also increasingly subjected to competing with other organisations, whether or not privately funded, in which research, education and scientific services were no longer integrated.

Central to the NPM policy in universities are a number of topics: government supported and regulated funding; external, public scrutiny, whether or not delegated; competition between institutions; hierarchical management; limited academic self-governance (Schimank 2005: 365). Public investment in university education and research (through various financial flows) supposedly justifies why universities have to be accountable. In turn, politicians have to convince the taxpayers of the necessity of such investments. Even for insiders, justification of public investment in universities currently happens almost automatically in terms of economic benefits: contribution to knowledge economy through spin-offs, patents, et cetera; education of highly qualified professionals; and so on.[2] According to the NPM policy, university 'governance' is a key tool for the proper functioning of the university.[3] This is a governance structure that distinguishes between the actual management of the organisation (the team of the university chancellor or rector) and the Board of Governors (also representing the stakeholders), which has the last word where management is concerned.

---

[2] For interesting information on the marketing of academic research, see Debackere (2006: 138-179) and the references there included.

[3] A concept taken *mutatis mutandis* from the corporate sector, cf. corporate governance.

Rightly or wrongly, the university was more and more described as the 'entrepreneurial university', the 'corporate university', the 'marketed university' or the 'all-administrative' university. To some this was considered as an ideal, to others as a nightmare.[4] Academics were very slow and rather meek in responding to these changes (Halffman & Radder 2003),[5] though numerous critical studies were published in Europe and elsewhere on the clearance sale or even on the end of the university - a McDonaldised university controlled by 'business logic'. In Belgium, the impact of NPM policy and university governance could mainly be perceived since the mid-1990s.

It goes without saying that the introduction of NPM policy was introduced with the best intentions and came with the highest expectations, i.e., to bring sharper focus in the academic tasks, to wake up sleeping entities, involve stakeholders, achieve public accountability, et cetera. And indeed, universities were better managed and better supervised than before. Research funding increased significantly, though not always evenly between all disciplines, and positive results were noticed. Never have so many articles been published in leading journals. The number of doctoral students has doubled between 1999 and 2014, going from 5,000 to 10,000 students. The number of postdocs has tripled (from 1,000 to 3,000) and is currently even slightly exceeding the number of professors, the latter segment only having welcomed an extra 600 full-time equivalents, which equals a mere 0.25% average yearly increase.[6] International visibility also intensified. Flanders wants to cooperate in developing the knowledge society and aims at becoming a major 'European research player', an ambition the current, limited professorial body is striving intensively and creatively to reach. With research increasingly contributing to the financial means universities are obtaining, pressure from the central university offices is intense. Research therefore plays an ever increasing part in each faculty's allocations and in how each individual professor is evaluated.

The new policy produced a continuous flow of interventions and regulations from government, delegated bodies and management: mandatory assessments and evaluations, performance appraisals, rigorous promotion procedures (with strong emphasis on bibliometric data and on securing funding through projects and doctoral students), accreditation, creation of associations, flexibility in study programmes and exams, a funding policy based on quantifiable indicators, the

---

[4] For a further description of this nightmare, see among others Tuchman (2009), Washburn (2003), Hayes & Wynyard (2002), Evans (2005), Burgan (2006), Ginsberg (2011), Djelic (2006).
[5] This delayed reaction could be explained by the fact that academics feel passionate about their profession, making them willingly accept multiple negative preconditions. But, typical of academics, this brought about a stream of research and publications on the topic, with historians, sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers and other (humanities) scientists looking into this phenomenon.
[6] Vlaams Indicatorenboek ('Flemish Indicatorbook') (2015: 32).

establishment of the VABB-SHW-list,[7] verification of professors' (English) language knowledge, et cetera. One can wonder whether the impact of such evolutions on individual professors and on the goings-on of our universities really has been thought through sufficiently?

2. The university as a corporation?

Up to a certain extent, universities are indeed corporations (networks, even, of smaller and larger corporations) that need to be managed in order to maintain their financial health. They have a human resources department, administrative and technical services, buildings and equipment that need maintenance, et cetera. Without these 'means' and their proper functioning, universities cannot fulfil their core tasks, i.e. teaching, research and scientific services. When speaking of the penetration of 'business logic' in universities, we, of course, do **not** want to criticise such aspects of the universities' functioning. We do, **however**, want to warn of the following phenomena, which may or may not be interrelated:

> 2.1 the idea of a university that is primarily (or even exclusively) serving the economy;
> 2.2. the danger of some of the university's corporate aspects (be they legitimate) getting the better of the university's actual objectives or core activities. The latter then run the risk of becoming secondary to corporate objectives that mainly focus on 'the means' and on how these are being used;
> 2.3 a kind of internal perversion of the university's core tasks (research, teaching and scientific services) by business-type ways of thinking and acting.

2.1 The university serving the economy

There is indeed a reductionist view of universities as instruments serving the economy, especially in certain political and economic circles. But such an 'economisation' does not necessarily imply (especially not in Flanders) that the university as a whole is seen from that point of view. The dominance of economic priorities in contemporary politics does, however, lead to most countries aiming their public funding towards (often expensive) key sectors and flagship projects (e.g. in medical science, in the exact sciences and engineering or in information technology). Certain curricula (e.g. prestigious business schools, Junior Colleges, et cetera) also seem to receive more means than others that are considered less prone to contribute to economic growth. Free fundamental research or research and education in certain social sciences and humanities are then at risk of being

---

[7] VABB-SHW is the Flemish Academic Bibliography for the Social Sciences and Humanities.

neglected.[8] The manner in which university governance is implemented will of course determine the degree to which the university is at risk of becoming 'economised'. What is the relation between the Board of Governors and the rectorial executive team? What role do groups and department chairpersons, deans and representatives of academic bodies, and all sorts of councils still hold? What is being considered the mission and the ethos of universities? These are all important aspects of implementing university governance. It would be interesting to examine how the Flemish universities evolved over the last decades when it comes to university management. A certain economisation has without a doubt arisen, or efforts have at least been made along those lines. We believe it is important to also draw attention to the two other manners in which business logic has penetrated the university.

2.2 Business logic first, core activities second

There is a real danger of **university governors turning aims into means and vice versa**. However that does not primarily seem to arise from the fact that universities are no longer (solely) managed by professors, but often by managers coming from the corporate world or the social profit sector. Similar processes and tendencies indeed seem to exist everywhere.[9] The heart of the trouble seems to come from the implementation of and the evolution within the NPM itself and with everything related to this. In the NPM (2.2.1) funding is determined by quantifiable data while (2.2.2) mutual competition is organised between and within universities to increase 'competitiveness'. Inevitably, the universities' management, whether or not with academics in charge, will thus primarily focus on managing those particular aspects that will safeguard or increase the perceived funding and market position and improve the institution's image.

2.2.1 Funding based on 'objectively' quantifiable data

Take, for instance, the *number of* PhD's. If this impacts on the universities' (direct) funding (the 2007 decree stating that 40% of the variable part of the universities' research funding is determined by its number of PhD's), the Board of Governors will make sure more doctorates are delivered. The allocation of funds inside universities (to groups and individuals alike) often follows the exact

---

[8] See the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences report *Effecten van universitaire profilering en topsectorenbeleid op de wetenschap in Nederland* ("The effects of academic profiling and top sectors policy on science in The Netherlands"): www.vsnu.nl/files/documenten/ Nieuwsberichten/rapport-knaw-witte-vlekken.pdf (consulted 26 October 2015).
[9] To some, the problem has indeed to do with academics being replaced by managers and administrators; see for instance Ginsberg (2011). Furthermore, the NPM separates management from implementation, with managers no longer feeling any direct connection to the organisation's key objectives, with all that this implies (see Buijs 2010).

same statutory (or external) financing system,[10] which has immediate side-effects for those faculties that (can) only produce so many PhD's and which thus see their first-stream funding drop. It is not rocket science to understand how this will shift attention from the intrinsic quality of the universities' core activities to measurable aspects that do not necessarily favour quality (for instance of doctoral research). By focusing on measurable output, those disciplines that provide less students, PhD's, projects or extra financial means are at risk of being under pressure, rejected even.[11] From the point of view of market logic (i.e. no money unless through proven 'usefulness'), it seems almost impossible to defend the universities' fundamental tasks (research for the purpose of research, the transmission of intellectual, cultural and scientific traditions) (Collini 2012, ch. 5).

2.2.2 Competition

All sorts of elements indicate that competition between universities is problematic. Almost all universities, including the Flemish ones, feel compelled to participate in the race to the top, despite their considerable differences or the uneven weapons they have to fight with (in a funding system where the overall budget remains the same or even decreases). According to experts, competition in not-for-profit sectors is inherently problematic[12] and the comparison between the institutions concerned (the famous rankings) seems anything but objective.[13] And still, the university's management is very keen on monitoring these little lists, if only for the attention they draw from the media and from politics.[14] Some universities, as some authors put it, should actually follow the credo "This university is not ruled by rankings", by analogy with "This university is an equal opportunity employer" (Gevers 2013: 14). At any rate, creating competition in these sectors comes with all types of questionable side-effects. Not only, as we said before, can the

---

[10] See Willaert (2013) for the (unfair) impact of the VABB-listings on the appraisal of individual researchers.

[11] This is rather frequent in the humanities, their situation having been precarious for quite some time, as their repeated pleas for more attention and financial means in The Netherlands prove: *Men weegt kaneel bij 't lood* (1995) and *Sustainable Humanities* (2009). Here and there, humanities' research or education have indeed been repealed for budgetary reasons (see e.g. the (inter)nationally highly mediatised 2010 repeal of the Philosophy department at Middlesex University, even though it was the university's highest ranked department) or are in danger of being repealed (see the 2014 commotion at the University of Amsterdam about the reorganisation/ phasing out of (certain) humanities; for interesting reflections on this topic, see Thomas (2015)).

[12] Not-for-profit sectors (such as the education sector and the health sector) are not really a market. Competition can therefore not take place in a 'normal' way; Tonkens (2008: 115).

[13] See the excellent and highly revealing articles of Gevers (2014, 2013). As an expert said, university rankings "serve no scientific purpose, but they absorb a lot of resources from the universities that have to produce the data [for the ranking organisations]" (citation from Gingras (2014: 116).

[14] Gevers (2014: 3): "enormous efforts and large budgets are spent by some universities to improve their positions in the world rankings. Engineering the position in the rankings sometimes takes precedence over the pursuit of the university's stated objectives".

legitimacy of so-called 'unproductive', though intellectually important sectors, be challenged, but a tendency to imitate the 'leaders' and to copy 'successful' projects or initiatives also takes shape. More and more universities will thus for instance wonder if they as well should not create expensive foreign branches or business schools to be able to compete on the worldwide academic market. We will discuss the consequences of the notion of competition on individual scholars further on.

One should finally wonder if the entire system of control mechanisms and competition does not lead to excessive (in)visible costs, means which can thus not be used for the university's core tasks. Surprisingly, there have hardly been any cost-benefit analyses in this regard.[15]

2.3 Internal perversion of core tasks

Let us now tackle the third aspect of implementing business logic in the universities: not only can the universities' core tasks become secondary to purely commercial targets, but they can also be hampered and/or internally perverted. In the NPM, the PR, HRM and ICT departments as well as all types of managerial planning, support and control inevitably gained in importance. Over the past decades, these departments, which of course want to prove their worth, saw their number of staff increase exponentially, especially when compared to the mandates that are actually performing the universities' core tasks.[16] This comes of course with an unrelenting wave of educational reforms (new forms of didactics, of examination methods, et cetera). Scholars and researchers are more or less 'surrendered' to the expertise and the availability of these departments, whilst constantly being solicited by them for any kind of information they think they are in need of. Quite frequently, these departments are mainly concerned with their own continuation, expansion and aims (which is a well-known sociological phenomenon).[17]

The NPM also comes with a continuous increase in all kinds of (non-)legal regulations (the notorious 'regulitis'), reporting and justification in light of the oh so praised transparency.[18] Everyone taking exams or wanting to be appointed or promoted obviously expects their appraisal to be unbiased and to take into account their merits. Hence the demand for more transparency and a thorough motivation of the decisions made. It has become nearly inconceivable to unreservedly accept an examiner's, jury's or committee's decision: their judgment has to be objectively assessable. Universities are themselves obsessively emphasising transparency (cf. the students' right of scrutiny in how examination results are obtained).

---

[15]   In The Netherlands, this issue has led to reflections, for instance, within the VSNU, on the costs of assessments; see also van der Burg (2012).

[16]   This also seems to be the case in the hospital sector; Desmet (2009: 78-79).

[17]   Insiders are well aware of the consequences: everything has to give way to meetings, information gathering, assessments, flexibility, and so on.

[18]   For a critical stance on the obsession with transparency, see O'Neill (2002).

But - if we are willing to think about it – we also know that such judgments (e.g. on who really understands a subject, who is suited for academic education or research, or on the soundness or the originality of research) cannot solely come from a couple of objectifiable parameters and that total transparency can therefore never exist. But focussing solely on objectifiable factors (like the number of publications or the number of citations) without a substantive appreciation and judgment will not lead to the better choice. Reality also shows that this system of superficial/ measurable transparency generates ever more contestation and dissatisfaction (cf. the constantly increasing number of contestations of examination results); it results in ever more regulations and bureaucratic burden. Faith in the judgment of insiders (or peers) is a vulnerable thing which sometimes leads to accidents or abuse. But trying to circumvent this faith by installing objective insurance schemes is not appropriate either and will produce perverse side-effects. American universities, incidentally, increasingly choose peer reviews, but only by carefully selected peers.

Most worrying, however, is that all of these developments internally pervert the universities' core tasks of teaching, research and scientific services. In this position paper, we can monitor but a couple of key examples and aspects.

2.3.1 Research

Agencies which fund or evaluate research quite often decide themselves on the areas or topics they want to finance research in. It remains to be seen if this will benefit the advancement of science and the freedom and originality of academic research. Current research policies seem to be confused about what it is they are actually pursuing (and measuring): excellence1 (to be at the 'top', competing with other groups or individuals) or excellence2 (the intrinsic quality of research). The one-sided emphasis on excellence1 does not seem conducive to new and authentic research (Guédon 2009; Gevers 2014: 3). It takes time to formulate new questions, to explore new ideas; publications do not always generate numerous citations; peers often consider certain research areas too risky to be willing to fund them; et cetera.

Complaints about how bibliometry influences and transforms scientific research in general and certain areas specifically are a well-known fact, which has also been picked up by the media[19].[20] Not only, are adequate measurements problematic,

---

[19]   See for instance "Wetenschapsmeter wil niet meer botweg wetenschap meten" [The science measurer no longer wants to bluntly measure science], *NRC Handelsblad* Saturday 7 December 2013, where the new director of the CWTS in Leiden says: "We have exaggerated".

[20]   For concise though solid information on the creation, problems and remedies of bibliometry and its use and abuse, see Blockmans, Engwall & Weaire (2014). Several studies examined the problems of and from bibliometry; see among others Radder (2010), Weingart (2005). Also see the next footnote. For specific problems in the humanities, see Billiet (2004).

even in those areas working with number of citations or impact factors.[21] But by attaching so much importance to quantifiable data in assessing institutions or groups, as well as individuals, side-effects emerge that impact on scientific research from within. In general, a situation arises that can be described as 'an upside down world': research and publications serving career and funding purposes rather than publications serving qualitatively interesting research. Examples of more specific problems are: a shift towards specialised research that already has access to interesting publication channels, avoiding long term or new/risky research (see Gevers 2014: 3), pressure to publish one's research in English, even when that is not really useful (by creating ever new English journals), 'shearing' or 'milking' research in order to increase the number of publications, et cetera.[22] At the end of their doctoral research, young researchers who want to obtain a postdoctoral fellowship from the Flemish Foundation for Scientific Research [FWO] or the universities research councils have to be able to submit several international (i.e. English) publications. This is detrimental for the depth of their research, especially in those fields which harbour research that (for instance) presumes a gradual development in methodological know-how, ability to interpret or reflection. Young researchers also feel compelled to direct their research towards project applications or career moves, probably even compromising quality in the process.[23] The kind of competition now prevailing can affect and even be (partially) incompatible with the accuracy, openness and collegiality required in scientific research.

The publications inflation is related to a publishing culture of mainly writing and hardly reading (it is barely possible to keep track of the number of publications in certain fields).[24] The pressure to publish undoubtedly contributed to certain increasingly important phenomena like scientific fraud and questionable research

---

[21]   For criticism on the use of the impact factor and other indices, see Michel Gevers (2014, 2013), J. Vanclay (2012). On the improper use of the impact factors, see also the *San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA)* (www.ascb.org/dora/), consulted 26 October 2015.
[22]   For arguments in favour of slow science, see for instance Stengers (2011); Boomkens (2008).
[23]   Paradoxically, when distributing postdoctoral positions, for instance, FWO-committees hardly take into account the quality of the doctorate itself (even if it is traditionally assessed by a jury containing external experts as well), but rather look at the 'international' publications, thus influencing the process of doctoral research (towards writing a number of articles on partial problems). This is particularly unfortunate in certain disciplines. For the results of a survey amongst Flemish academics on the declining quality of doctorates in Flanders, see *Hoger onderwijs in tijden van massificatie: de werkvloer van docenten trekt aan de alarmbel: meer kwaliteit, minder kwantiteit is nodig*, Itinera-Instituut, (2013).
[24]   Cf. the publication urge phenomenon which is now also getting attention from the media, see www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2012/03/17/publicatiedrift-wetenschappers-neemt-groteske-vormen-aan (consulted 7 December 2015).

practices,[25] which are sometimes extremely difficult to detect due to the inflation of publications. The prevailing models in bibliometry stimulate the tendency to redirect research towards topics or areas that are more popular with the scientific 'market'. They can even result in the phasing out of certain fields that are considered of no prolific interest. **Measurement is therefore not neutral: it genuinely affects the internal way of thinking and researching.** The uniform view on the excellence criteria (A1 culture, number of citations), in opposition with the variety in research cultures, is particularly upsetting.

2.3.2 Teaching

Teaching and service to society also undergo a number of undesirable side-effects, to do, primarily, with the huge importance of research and its results on appraisals, other tasks thus at risk of being undervalued (Willaert 2013). As a consequence, many lecturers try to reduce their teaching assignment to a minimum or entrust temporary assistants with certain tasks, or they resort to certain types of exams that exonerate them from correcting them themselves.[26] One may wonder about the real added value of several formal requirements regarding evaluations, endless explanations and motivations, transparency, et cetera. Examination regulations, for instance, have become so complex that oral exams are being phased out, even though they allow – especially in certain contexts – for an excellent, even essential, way of testing knowledge and competency.[27] In the current context, students are taught to behave like customers choosing goods on the education market in order to acquire the 'right', i.e. marketable, skills.[28] This affects the manner in which university teaching, which increasingly tends towards 'professional' rather than academic education, is conceived. Many professors have their doubts about the

---

[25] Examples of questionable research practices: cherry picking, data snooping, gift authorship, et cetera (see *Briefing Paper. Research Integrity: What it Means, Why it Is Important and How we Might Protect it*. December 2015. Science Europe 2015 (pdf). Scientific fraud is a bone of contention that has now even attracted the attention of the European Council. See i.a. Schuyt and Rahimi Bahmany's recent work (2014). Research into Flemish academics' opinions on fraud can be found in the Itinera Instituut analysis, p. 4; for the widely publicised Stapel case (fraud in psychology), see Abma (2013). For a report on a KU Leuven symposium on research fraud and further related literature, see Godecharle (2014).

[26] Evaluation protocols that try to adjust the undervaluation of teaching and/or service to society are being developed (see for instance the Standard Evaluation Protocol 2015-2020, i.e. the protocol for research assessments in the Netherlands approved by the VSNU, the KNAW and the NWO). Researchers have to be capable of a high degree of self-management to prepare for an assessment within such a protocol. Moreover, people are sceptical as to the 'workability' of such complicated protocols.

[27] In any case, they become increasingly less frequent. See for instance www.uu.nl/nieuws/ diesrede-van-frits-van-oostrom-over-onderwijs-als-gesprek-in-nrc-en-scienceguide (consulted 27 November 2015).

[28] These days, students are consumers; they purchase credits or competencies instead of education. For a critical reflection on competency thinking, see Masschelein & Simons (2007) and Pattyn (2007).

current system leaving (sufficient) room for thorough intellectual education, for original and out of the box thinking and for (the emergence of) genuine talent.

2.3.3 Service to society

Currently, service to society and service internal to the institution are not just considered less important than the other core tasks, they are also valued only in as far as they can be measured. Present universities are the heirs or at least the followers of institutions that have sometimes existed for a long time, flourishing thanks to the efforts made by past generations. That is why they hold a particular cultural and intellectual responsibility. Nowadays, however, the activities mainly encouraged are those which boost the universities' reputation (ideally in the visual media) or which they can financially capitalise on. Other important tasks that used to receive a lot of attention, meanwhile seem to have been discredited (teacher training, for instance, but also teaching in general) (Barnett 2009). Tasks of public engagement, like cooperating in exhibitions, giving public lectures, providing free advice, mentoring discussion groups, administering not-for-profit organisations (like Academies!), are increasingly considered a waste of time. In some faculties, scientific services, such as large but also smaller consulting and service contracts, are strongly encouraged and appreciated, the professors' know-how, the manpower (often young researchers appointed to other projects) as well as the infrastructure (often obtained to perform fundamental research) of one or more departments being used to assist companies in their quest for innovation. These contracts generate precious (because 'free') working capital, contribute to the possible employability of young assistants and can bring about spin-offs. But this type of service almost inevitably impacts on the young researchers' time for doctoral research and on the primary objectives of the technical personnel and the tools at hand.

2.3.4 Internal service

One cannot help but notice that ever less candidates are found for taking up internal service within the university, for core policy functions (heads of department, study programme coordinators, chairpersons of examination boards, et cetera, even for the more prestigious offices of dean, director of education or director of research). Even the function of rector, the 'primus inter pares', hardly attracts any candidates. It is essential, though, that professors continue to have their say in the education and research policies, that they keep committing themselves, on all levels, to the general interest of the students and the research community. A worrying trend here is that of young academics increasingly being propelled into steering roles by elder colleagues who would rather focus on their own research (and teaching).

3. Consequences for academic work

The major changes in the academic world since the eighties and nineties inevitably impact on the professors' statute and work. Just like the universities converted from being (traditional) institutions into (managed) organisations that pursue a certain output (of degrees, publications, spin-offs, et cetera), so did professors turn into professionals who have to help their organisation reach its desired output (De Dijn 2015). This impacts negatively on academic freedom of teaching and research, on loyalty towards the institution, on job satisfaction, et cetera.[29] The changes that occurred in the governance structures due to the introduction of university governance and the demise or mitigation of collegial governance (with its different types of councils and their representatives) led many professors to no longer consider their university to be 'theirs', a malaise which can be felt in all European and American faculties and apparently, above all, (but not solely) in the humanities (Donoghue 2008). Observers notice that a similar malaise affects 'free' or 'independent' professions in other sectors. This is undoubtedly related to major changes in the work itself in public sectors such as education and care, and especially to the emergence and the general implementation of the NPM policy and the manner in which public sectors have since been organised.

The malaise experienced by numerous academics seems to run particularly deep: "a large majority of the consulted academics is clearly concerned about a degrading academic scene, pressured by what some perceive as '*market-ing*' and others as the growing '*bureaucratisation*' of the universities. No less than 77% of the respondents indicate that their universities apply ever more bureaucracy and increasingly standardise the academic profession. 70% of all respondents confirm that everything more and more revolves around increasing their university's or faculty's market share" (Itinera analysis, p. 2). In 2013, the Actiegroep Hoger Onderwijs was established in Flanders, a group which develops a diversity of initiatives and publishes its own critical analyses and that of multiple academics on its website.[30] On social media worldwide, numerous groups and networks tackle this problem.

Before discussing specific consequences and complaints (such as 'an overload of bureaucracy'), it might be interesting to highlight the malaise's diffuse nature and to wonder where it comes from, in order to get to the core of the problem.[31] It

---

[29] For research into the malaise in Flanders, see the Itinera Institute analysis, *Hoger onderwijs in tijden van massificatie: de werkvloer van docenten trekt aan de alarmbel: meer kwaliteit, minder kwantiteit is nodig* (2013); see also, with further references, Willaert (2007).

[30] See https://actiegroephogeronderwijs.wordpress.com/ (consulted 21 August 2015); this website also presents a "Conceptnota AHO" (24 November 2013 version) (consulted 26 October 2015).

[31] The Itinera Analyse does not tackle this topic at all. See footnote 29.

is striking that the complaints arising from the queries are not or hardly related to the fundamental changes regarding NPM and university governance, not even to the waning importance of boards and representatives of different kinds in the universities' management, but very specifically to 'the love for [and the conception of] one's (own) work in times of management'.[32] In Uwe Schimank's words, the malaise is related to some kind of 'clash of cultures': "what one side [the professors] views as a necessary condition for work that benefits society at large, the other [policy-makers and administrators] interprets as a profound lack of interest in the needs of society. Deeply distrustful, policy-makers have come to read 'autonomy' as 'irresponsibility'." (Schimank 2005: 372). Key here are the terms trust and autonomy. Many professors feel they have become part of a system that insufficiently puts its trust in them and that curtails their freedom and their responsibilities. At the same time, they are convinced this prevents the university from properly performing its tasks.

3.1 Issues

3.1.1. Academic freedom

Academic freedom is a *first issue*.[33] It stands to reason that there is no such thing as total academic freedom; professors are undeniably willing to subject to reasonable requests to justify themselves to their institution, to mutual cooperation in teaching and research and to administrative tasks and services. But the key term here should be 'fairness', which, according to professors, is domain-specific and implies internal understanding of research, teaching, examining, et cetera (in sometimes very disparate fields). Many professors are currently under the impression that outsiders (managers, administrators, auditors) decide on what has to occur in the field itself and how it should be done.

3.1.2. Lack of trust

A *second issue* is a widely perceived lack of trust. This crisis of trust does not only affect academic education, but is rather a generalised societal phenomenon that has been examined by different types of human sciences (Achterhuis, Ankersmit, e.a., 2008). In large professional organisations with numerous employees, a high level of mobility, flexibility, et cetera, personal trust is bound to be replaced (mainly) by system trust (De Dijn 2002), implying that everyone is subjected to similar objective, systematic forms of control and scrutiny. Such control and scrutiny would also be required to guarantee optimal functioning to the organisation's

---

[32] See Desmet (2009), *Liefde voor het werk in tijden van management*, on the malaise experienced by 'professionals' in the health care sector.

[33] See also Marc Rigaux' op-ed piece, dating as far back as 5 March 2011, "Van academische vrijheid naar geformatteerde dwang. Voor het behoud van een vrije wetenschapsbeoefening" op: www.dewereldmorgen.be/artikels/2011/03/05 (consulted 31 October 2015).

stakeholders and customers. Professors are perfectly aware that a (minor) part of their segment is under-performing and agree with assessments and corrective actions to counter this, but we should beware of the negative consequences of excessive assessments for the well-performing majority of professors. Professors are not opposed to reasonable evaluations, but they do believe that generalised, systematic scrutiny and assessment processes are an indication, on the one hand, of distrust towards the vast majority of dedicated professors, and are time and money consuming on the other. They believe that universities, particularly, should have faith in the reasonableness, responsibility and authority of their core 'professionals'.[34] The manner, for instance, in which exams are currently organised and regulated (even on a strictly legal level) from the top down leads to impoverishment, mechanisation and standardisation. It is inconsistent with the lecturer's responsibility to conduct a specific, adequate evaluation and to make an assessment that does take into account not only knowledge and certain skills, but also understanding and originality (assessment is not like marking answers in a quiz).

3.2. Concrete adverse consequences

What now are *the most salient and the most listed adverse consequences* of the new university policy for professors' tasks? The Actiegroep Hoger Onderwijs analysis shows that the obvious culprits are (1) the excessive workload and pressure to perform, (2) the bureaucratic burden, and (3) the unreasonable focus during assessments on measurable rather than on qualitative factors.

3.2.1 An unreasonable increase in workload[35]

There are complaints about how the changes related to the new university policy and the Flemish ambitions regarding education (democratisation, flexibilisation, internationalisation) and research (to be a major player internationally) lead to an unreasonable increase in workload. This is the case for primary tasks like teaching (ever more students, extensive diversification of forms of teaching) and research (more PhD students and postdocs, the infamous pressure to publish and to acquire funding through projects, et cetera) as well as for new, secondary tasks (the obligation to react to insistent requests for information and assessments, limited administrative support, et cetera). The limited amount of financial resources entails a higher work pressure and too poor success rates in project applications: this involves a huge waste of time, not just for those applying for

---

[34] Paradoxically, the corporate world itself has become very sceptical about the usefulness of annual appraisal interviews; see the file in this regard in De Standaard, Saturday 5 - Sunday 6 December 2015, "Eindscore van de evaluatie: onvoldoende"; also available via www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20151204_02005508 (consulted 7 December 2015).
[35] This issue is at the heart of the recent satisfaction surveys (autumn 2015) held among the Flemish universities' professors.

funding, but also for those assessing the applications. The system of competitive research applications and limited success rates – combined with harsh promotions procedures and workload – has become the major source of frustration.

Incidentally, this also generates frustration among an increasing number of postdocs who are left without adequate future prospects. Needless to say that most of the numerous PhD students and postdocs[36] will not obtain academic positions, which is why their transition to the outside job market must become a topic of constant care and attention.[37]

The unreasonable increase in the teaching load also results from the (already untenable) flexibilisation of the educational system which allows each student to customise their programme, thus impacting on class and exam schedules. This implies e.g. that a professor has to draw up several exams for one and the same topic and has to mobilise teaching assistants at various moments. The (as it is, very successful) participation of Flanders in the Bologna process enhances the adverse impact of this flexibilisation. Universities are becoming aware of this and make efforts to adapt to the challenges of digitalisation as well as efforts to better guide their students and relieve pressure on their professors.[38]

3.2.2 A dramatic shortage of professors

Another crucial issue is the ratio number of professors vs. number of students, PhD's, project officers and postdocs (whom the professor is responsible for). This ratio is totally out of balance: despite the spectacular increase in number of students (a 1/3 increase over the last decade) and the unprecedented inflation in predoctoral and postdoctoral researchers, the increase in number of professors is exponentially far below par (see the Ecoom statistics).[39] The number of doctoral students in Flanders has doubled between 1999 and 2014. Doctorates, however, have to be completed in ever shorter periods of time and should preferably be complemented with a couple of nice publications. Though we know how motivated and bright our doctoral students are, the professors' contribution should not be underestimated: the latter are 'burdened' with submitting applications (the success

---

[36] For more information on how the number of junior and postdoctoral researchers at the Flemish universities evolved between 1999 and 2014, see the Vlaams Indicatorenboek (2015: 33).

[37] See Lieve Van Hoof's contribution at "The Doctoral Space" Thinkers' programme kick-off meeting, Class of Natural Sciences, KVAB, February 2016.

[38] See the KVAB's Standpunten 33 "Higher education in the digital era" and 34 "Hoger onderwijs voor de digitale eeuw" at www.kvab.be/standpunten.

[39] For the 1999-2014 period, the Vlaams Indicatorenboek 2015 (2015: 33, fig. 3.7) notes an 82.8% increase in predoctoral researchers (from 5,254 FTE to 9,608) and a 145.3% increase in postdoctoral researchers. During the same period, the total number of professors, however, only saw a 28.9% increase (from 2,332 FTE to 3,008). Each professor is currently in charge of supervising an average of 4.25 predoctoral and postdoctoral researchers, compared to a mere 2.81 in 1999.

rates of which being very poor sometimes), with supervising the thesis, monitoring publications of inexperienced researchers and taking care of the young doctor's future career. After all, temporary postdoctoral fellowships (3,352 researchers in 2014, financed through external means)[40] are currently primarily meant to provide researchers with the opportunity to valorise their own research and to establish themselves on the sometimes limited research, innovation and academic labour market. Very often, though, they are the ones taking over research and mentoring tasks from their promoters, because the latter are overburdened by management and fundraising. Many of them – and ever more so the foreign researchers – jump from one project to another, hoping for an all too often temporary and part-time professorial position. The workload, uncertain prospects and sometimes excessive demands for mobility[41] undoubtedly dissuade candidates who would have been excellent for the job (this is especially the case in certain faculties and for female candidates). These people then end up in other parts of the labour market, where they are often, though definitely not always, highly appreciated. They imply, however, a missed return on investment when it comes to high-quality Education, Research and Innovation - especially in the STEM disciplines.

3.2.3 The clash between loyal cooperation and competition

The need to participate in securing second- and third-stream funding (when trying to obtain a position or a promotion) compels professors to turn into managers who constantly worry about their own careers and the careers of the personnel working in their labs, sections or centres. Professors should be able to work as colleagues, but are now in direct competition with each other, not only in trying to be promoted, but also when applying for funding and fellowships. This is what Stefan Collini refers to as the danger of "a world of educational Darwinism", which inevitably leads to pressure to perform and/or to more or less cynical manoeuvring to circumvent this pressure. Proper core funding could help restrain this excessive competition.

3.2.4 Unreasonable pressure to publish

It is appropriate to specifically mention the pressure to publish and its consequences (we will not tackle the bibliometric problem again). It goes without saying that every single professor believes in quality publications of their research results as part of their main tasks. They do contest, however, the pressure to publish, mainly in terms of quantifiable output and financial contributions, a pressure which leads

---

[40] See VLIR, *Statistische gegevens betreffende het personeelsbestand aan de Vlaamse universiteiten (telling 01 februari 2014)*, 2014, www.vlir.be/media/docs/Personeelsstatistieken/VLIR_statistiekenrapport14_BWdefinitief.pdf (consulted 27 November 2015).

[41] On the pros and cons of academic mobility, see Maja (Magazine van de Jonge Academie), 2, March 2015.

to short-termism with regard to research, to all kinds of attempts (sometimes lacking integrity) at boosting 'production' and to a tendency to neglect other key tasks, a situation which, in turn, leads to dismay, either at themselves or at their colleagues. Another reason for dismay is the competition between universities and research institutions to attract individuals who can improve their prestige and their number of publications and citations, often offering them better positions (e.g. little or no teaching or policy functions) at the expense of other professors. This also contributes to the 'regular' professors' malaise, especially if it results in less opportunities of being appointed or promoted.

3.2.5 Extreme bureaucratic burden and excessive regulation

As we mentioned before, the universities also saw their managerial and supporting departments expand with the NPM and experienced the implementation of a policy of system trust and all that this implies. This resulted in a variety of new demands perceived by many professors as additional, unreasonable, and even detrimental burdens to their core activities, undoubtedly explaining their complaints about bureaucratic burden and excessive regulation. The NPM generated similar complaints in other sectors as well; these complaints can, therefore, not merely be the reactions of some out-of-touch individuals in their ivory towers.

4. Recommendations

We will now make some recommendations that have already largely been made elsewhere (see, among others, the AHO concept note and the Itinera analysis). It is also important, however, to continuously and thoroughly reflect on the context within which professors work and on the university's finality, which is why we will specifically make some conclusive considerations on the impact of 'business logic' on universities and on the relation of trust between the university's governance and its professors, as well as on the idea of a 'public' university.

4.1 Concrete recommendations and remedies

These recommendations are directed at the government (with 1 and 2 requiring a review of the current finance act), at the university managers (3, 6 and 7), and at both (4 and 5).

1. Reduce the dependency on competitive project funding by increasing core funding to fulfil the basic needs;

2. Reduce the impact of the number of doctorates on university research funding or, at least, modulate the impact of this factor according to the relevance, need and use of PhD's in the various scientific disciplines;

3. Avoid using the same allocation keys and formulae applied for the distribution of funds between universities (at macro level) inside universities for the allocation of financial means to departments (meso level) or even in the evaluation of individuals (micro level);

4. Deal with excessive workload and pressure by a better junior-senior academic ratio, by easing the bureaucratic burden and by providing administrative and technical support that effectively contributes to executing the core academic tasks;

5. Put quality and not mainly quantity at the heart of research goals; refrain from strictly measurable assessments of individuals (and stop using faulty indicators, see notes 20 and 21); quality is a domain-specific value and should be evaluated as such;

6. Drastically rethink evaluation procedures (specifically in case of appointments and promotions): today they are too superficial and too frequent. A thorough selection, based on a broad and diversified analysis and evaluation, is especially important in case of first appointments. Afterwards, young lecturers should be given sufficient time to build a career;

7. Revalue teaching and scientific service to society within the evaluation procedures of professors, without, however, repeating the same mistake as has been made with regard to research assessment (objectification, quantification, competitiveness).

Times have probably never been more favourable than the present to implement reasonable changes and to abandon excessive or useless measures. Both government and universities seem to have become aware of the problem, as the postponement of (external) assessments until 2020 and the efforts to reduce the planning burden of accreditation indicates. These days, universities are themselves in charge of quality monitoring their three core tasks, which they would tackle best by critically considering the extremely burdensome reference frameworks imposed by government. New, less competitive procedures with regard to promotions are also implemented, in order to tone down the unhealthy competition between young professors.

4.2 Final considerations

Academics should persist, out of their 'love of their work in times of management', in informing the public and the politicians about the perverse effects of business logic. More generally, they should also keep stressing that universities are more than merely a very important tool for a country's economic welfare, they also carry a larger, more profound meaning as being a valuable 'public and common resource' (Collini 2012, ch. 5; Boulton & Lucas 2008; Masschelein & Simons 2009). Key topics for reflection and remediation:

– Purely external audits, especially when not conducted by peers in a certain field, can (as we argued) only be detrimental for the university's core business. The only option, therefore, is to **at least complement measurable data with a qualitative assessment by peers**. General distrust in peers (some of whom may unfortunately be sometimes untrustworthy) inevitably leads to a system that negatively affects activities from within. Things that seem obvious or rational from a certain perspective, can, on closer inspection, be extremely unreasonable. Focusing on so-called objective measurements will inevitably distort what the universities' activities are actually about, i.e. (domain-specific) quality instead of quantity. By using quantifiable results, the only thing proven to the outsiders is that certain figures have been met, without saying much about quality (especially not about domain-specific quality), which is what Stefan Collini calls the 'fallacy of accountability': "the belief that the process of reporting on an activity in the approved form provides some guarantee that something worthwhile has been properly done" (Collini 2012: 108).

– There is a constant urge for ever more **transparency**. The systems that have been put in place to this effect clearly generated even more contestation and discontent (cf. the ever increasing number of contestations of exam results, assessments, promotions). **Trust** is vulnerable, sometimes linked to deceit and to poor judgment, but trying to avoid trust by so-called objective safety schemes leads to perverse side-effects (including excessive regulation and most probably also financial waste). But how can one circumvent this Catch-22 situation? There is no such thing as a perfect solution, no solution without possible abuse on the

one hand or without fatal side-effects on the other. Then, isn't the best solution the one where everyone admits to the necessity of trust while at the same time appealing to professional pride within a framework, such as the university, that despite everything still strongly induces such virtues? This implies, of course, that both the public and the politicians recognise the impossibility of fully controlling human processes.

– There is nothing wrong, in se, with wishing that university research and education meet economic needs and contribute to the welfare of the community which provides considerable public funds to the institution. However, when this becomes the prime, or even the only, incentive to support universities (and education in general), it tells a lot about the community in question and its targets/goals. Would that not be an indication of an extremely limited and ultimately defeatist vision on the citizen and on society as a whole? There is more to life, indeed, than merely economical goods. There are, for instance, public goods that are not used similarly or with the same intensity by everyone, but which citizens generally consider goods they want to maintain, such as social security, basic health care, childcare and youth welfare, but also all types of heritage, public parks (and spatial planning in general), museums, and even universities. Why would the taxpayer not be able to understand that university funding is not only required to produce professionals and to deliver research results that directly serve the economy, but also to create study programmes that prepare for and give room for fundamental research, autonomous intellectual thought and the study and practice of art? Who cannot understand the importance of safeguarding, cultivating and transferring cultural and intellectual traditions that made us who we are (such as the tradition of freedom of thought)? And thus the need for institutions that can revive these traditions from within? Who cannot understand that it requires another type of logic than business logic to vitalise these traditions and that it takes other efforts than striving to be the best, the biggest, the wealthiest to preserve and bring to fruition their diverse activities? It is up to intellectuals and academics to restore if necessary this understanding, which is why we **advocate a public university and the university as a public good**. We agree that a lot of money goes to insuring or increasing welfare, but for a society to hold a future it must provide space for activities that are not immediately fruitful, and in which individuals guided by 'masters' are allowed to participate and to engage in pursuits that are goals in themselves. How can one motivate young people to dedicate their lives to science, to art, to understanding nature, mankind and society? How can one teach them to be genuinely interested in any type of work or task when the society they live in only preaches success and competition and considers all other goals unworthy and uninteresting?

Summary

Being a professor in 2016
Reflections on a profession in a changing world

Universities are without any doubt powerful forces in the development of economic welfare, but first and foremost they are places where knowledge is created and communicated at the highest intellectual level. They provide services of various kinds to society, and impart knowledge valued in and for itself. University professors are the key actors in these endeavours.

The last three decades have witnessed profound alterations within universities, affecting their management as well as the core aspects of their mission, i.e. teaching, research and service to the community. These changes have had a huge impact on the academic profession in both positive and negative ways. Positively, universities are managed more efficiently, student numbers have grown significantly, more funding, especially for research, has been made available, and international visibility has increased. On the negative side, many studies point to heightened – and, to a certain extent, perverse – pressure and competition, ever expanding bureaucratic burdens, and a growing imbalance between the various core tasks. Others lay bare a fundamental change in the relation of trust between the academic and his/her host institution.

This position paper seeks to analyse not only the symptoms, but also the underlying causes of this malaise, and concludes with some recommendations to university managers and policy makers. Starting from a description of the characteristics of the New Public Management policy applied also to universities, the authors warn of unwanted side-effects: the danger that financial means become goals in themselves, the focus on purely quantitative measurement, the lack of attention given to the specificity of different disciplines. All these factors affect the core activities of universities in many diverse ways. Concretely, for professors these changes have led to an ever increasing workload and competitive pressure, the feeling that they are not evaluated on the basis of the most appropriate criteria, and ultimately the fear that the necessary conditions are missing for doing their professional work in the best possible way, allowing for creativity, passion, and time to reflect and do research in depth.

This position paper proposes seven recommendations, of which 1 and 2 concern government agencies; 3 and 4 university managers; 5, 6 and 7 concern both.

Recommendation 1. Reduce the dependency on competitive project funding by increasing core funding to fulfil the basic needs.

Recommendation 2. Reduce the impact of the number of doctorates on university research funding (at the moment 40% of the variable part) or, at least, modulate the impact of this factor according to the scientific discipline in question.

Recommendation 3. Avoid using the same allocation keys and formulae applied for the distribution of funds between universities (at a macro-level) inside universities, i.e. for the allocation of financial means to departments (meso-level) and in the evaluation of individuals (micro-level).

Recommendation 4. Deal with excessive workload and pressure by a better junior-senior academic ratio, by easing the bureaucratic burden, and by providing administrative and technical support which is effectively contributing to the execution of the core tasks.

Recommendation 5. Put quality and not mainly quantity at the heart of research goals and assessments; this is particularly important with respect to evaluation procedures of individuals. Quality is a domain-specific value.

Recommendation 6. Drastically rethink evaluation procedures (today they are too superficial and too frequent); adequate evaluation is especially important in the case of first appointments.

Recommendation 7. Revalue teaching and scientific service to society within the evaluation procedures.

References

Abma Ruud, 2013. *De publicatiefabriek. Over de betekenis van de affaire Stapel*, Nijmegen, Vantilt.

Achterhuis Hans, Frank Ankersmit, e.a., 2008. *De vertrouwenscrisis. Over het krakend fundament van de samenleving*, Amsterdam, Meulenhoff.

Barnett Ronald, e.a., 2009. *Rethinking the University after Bologna. New Concepts and Practices Beyond Tradition and the Market*, Antwerpen, UCSIA.

Billiet Jaak, e.a., 2004. *Bibliometrie in de humane wetenschappen* (Standpunt nr. 3), Brussels, Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts.

Blockmans Wim, Lars Engwall & Denis Weaire (eds.), 2014. *Bibliometrics: Use and Abuse in the Review of Research Performance*, London, Portland Press.

Blockmans Wim, Lars Engwall, Denis Weaire, 2014. "Science as Big Business", in Wim Blockmans, Lars Engwall & Denis Weaire (eds.), *Bibliometrics: Use and Abuse in the Review of Research Performance*, p. 143-150.

Boer Harry de, Jürgen Enders & Uwe Schimank, 2007. "On the way towards new public management? The governance of university systems in England, the Netherlands, Austria, and Germany", in Dorothea Jansen (ed.), *New Forms of Governance in Research Organisations. Disciplinary Approaches, Interfaces and Integration*, Dordrecht, Springer, p. 137-152.

Boomkens René, 2008. *Topkitch en slow science. Kritiek van de academische rede*, Amsterdam, Van Gennep.

Boulton Geoffrey & Colin Lucas, 2008. *What Are Universities For?* Leuven, LERU Publications (September 2008); available on www.leru.org

Buijs Govert, 2010. "De banaliteit van de manager", *Trouw*, sectie Letter en Geest, 30 January 2010.

Burg Wibren van der, 2012. "De onzichtbare kosten van controle- en selectieprocedures. NWO-promotieprojecten op het terrein van recht en bestuur als casestudy", *Nederlands Juristenblad* 36, 2528-2537.

Burgan Mary, 2006. *What Ever Happened to the Faculty? Drift and Decision in Higher Education*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Commissie Toekomst van de Geesteswetenschappen, 1995. *Men weegt kaneel bij 't lood*, Utrecht. Commissie Toekomst van de geesteswetenschappen.

Collini Stefan, 2012. *What Are Universities For*?, London, Penguin.

Debackere Koenraad, 2006. "Commercialisering van universitair onderzoek", in Bart Pattyn & Geertrui Van Overwalle (red.), *Tussen Markt en Agora. Over het statuut van universitaire kennis*, Leuven, Peeters, p. 138-179.

Debackere Koenraad & Reinhilde Veugelers (red.), 2015. *Vlaams Indicatorenboek Wetenschap, Technologie, Innovatie*, Expertisecentrum O&O Monitoring, ISSN 1374-6294, www.ecoom.be/Indicatorenboek2015.

De Dijn Herman, 2002. "De invloed van het management op het hoger onderwijs", *Tijdschrift voor onderwijsrecht en onderwijsbeleid*, nov.-dec. 2002, 202-206.

De Dijn Herman, 2015. "Professors or Professionals", *Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice* 7:2, 40–45.

De Ridder-Symoens Hilde, 2006. "The University as European Cultural Heritage: A Historical Approach", *Higher Education in Europe* 31:4, 369-379.

Desmet Marc, 2009. *Liefde voor het werk in tijden van management*, Tielt, Lannoo.

Djelic Marie-Laure, 2012. "Scholars in the Audit Society: Understanding our Contemporary Iron Cage", in Lars Engwall (ed.), *Scholars in Action. Past – Present – Future. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Nova Acta Regiae Societatis Scientiarum Upsaliensis.* Series V: Vol. 2, p. 97-121.

Donoghue Frank, 2008. *The Last Professors. The Corporate University and the Fate of the Humanities*, New York, Fordham University Press.

Evans Mary, 2005. *Killing Thinking. The Death of the University*, London, Continuum.

Ferlie Ewan, 1997. *The New Public Management in Action*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Gevers Michel, 2013. "The pressure induced by the rankings", www.ethicalforum.be/downloads/2013.

Gevers Michel, 2014. "Scientific perfomance indicators: a critical appraisal and a country by country analysis", in Wim Blockmans, Lars Engwall and Denis Weaire (eds.), *Bibliometrics: Use and Abuse in the Review of Research Performance* (Proceedings From a Symposium Held in Stockholm, 23-25 May 2013), London, Portland Press, p. 43-53.

Gingras Yves, 2014. "Criteria for Evaluating Indicators", in Blaise Cronin & Cassidy R. Sugimoto (eds.), *Bibliometrics and Beyond: Harnessing Multidimensional Indicators of Scholarly Research*, Cambridge (MA), MIT Press, ch. 6.

Ginsberg Benjamin, 2011. *The Fall of the Faculty. The Rise of the All-administrative University and Why It Matters*, Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press.

Guédon Jean-Claude, 2009. "Between Excellence and Quality. The European Research Area in Search of Itself", in Ronald Bartlett, e.a., *Rethinking the*

University After Bologna. New Concepts and Practices Beyond Tradition and the Market, Antwerp, UCSIA, p. 57-79.

Godecharle Simon, 2014. "Research Fraud: What Can and Should Be Done?", *Ethische Perspectieven* 24:3, 275-282.

Halffman Willem & Hans Radder, 2003. "Het academisch manifest. Van een bezette naar een publieke universiteit', *Krisis. Tijdschrift voor actuele filosofie* 2003:3, 2-18.

Hayes Dennis & Robin Wynyard (eds.), 2002. *The McDonaldization of Higher Education*, Westport, CT, Bergin & Garvey.

Hood Christopher & B. Guy Peters, 2004. "The middle aging of new public management. Into the age of paradox?", *Journal of Public Administration and Theory* 14:3: 267-282.

Itinera-Instituut, 2013. *Hoger onderwijs in tijden van massificatie: de werkvloer van docenten trekt aan de alarmbel: meer kwaliteit, minder kwantiteit is nodig*, www.itinerainstitute.org/sites/default/files/articles/pdf/definitieve_versie_rapport_ho.pdf.

KNAW-rapport, 2013. *Effecten van universitaire profilering en topsectorenbeleid op de wetenschap in Nederland*, www.vsnu.nl/files/documenten/Nieuwsberichten/rapport-knaw-witte-vlekken.pdf.

Masschelein Jan & Maarten Simons, 2007. "Competentiegericht onderwijs als strategische doelstelling. Enkele kritische reflecties", *Ethische Perspectieven* 17:4, 398-421.

O'Neill Onora, 2002. *Autonomy and Trust* (The BBC Reith lecture 2002). Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Pattyn Bart, 2007. "Competenties en ideologie. Het dictaat van een expanderend concept", *Ethische Perspectieven* 17:4, 422-435.

Pattyn Bart en Geertrui Van Overwalle (red.), 2006, *Tussen Markt en Agora. Over het statuut van universitaire kennis*, Peeters, Leuven.

Radder Hans (ed.), 2010. *The Commodification of Academic Research. Science and the Modern University*, Pittsburgh, Pittsburg University Press.

San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment (DORA), 2008, www.ascb.org/dora/.

Schimank Uwe, 2005. "'New Public Management' and the Academic Profession: Reflections on the German Situation", *Minerva* 43, 361-376.

Schuyt Kees en Rahii Bahmany Leila, 2014. *Tussen fout en fraude. Integriteit en oneerlijk gedrag in wetenschappelijk onderzoek*, Leiden, Leiden University Press.

Stengers Isabelle, 2011. *Another Science is Possible. A Plea for Slow Science*. Inaugurele lezing Chair Willy Calewaert 2011-12 (VUB, 13 December 2011), http://threerottenpotatoes.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/stengers2011_pleaslowscience.pdf.

Sustainable Humanities, 2009. Report from the Committee on the National Plan for the Future of the Humanities, Commissie Nationaal Plan Toekomst Geestes-wetenschappen, Amsterdam University Press.

Thomas Casper, 2015. *Competente rebellen. Hoe de universiteit in opstand kwam tegen het marktdenken*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Tonkens Evelien, 2008. "Marktwerking in de zorg: duur, bureaucratisch en demotiverend", in Frank Ankersmit & Leo Klinkers (red.), *De tien plagen van de staat. De bedrijfsmatige overheid gewogen*. Amsterdam, Van Gennep, p. 103-131.

Tuchman Gaye, 2009. *Wannabe U. Inside the Corporate University*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Vanclay Jerome K., 2012. "Impact factor. Outdated artefact or stepping-stone to journal certification?", *Scientometrics* 92:2, 211-238.

Washburn Jennifer, 2003*. University, Inc. The Corporate Corruption of Higher Education*, New York, Basic Books.

Weingart Peter, 2005. "Impact of bibliometrics upon the science system. Inadverted consequences", *Scientometrics* 62:1, 117-13.

Willaert Frank, 2007. "Waar zijn de professoren?", in Patrick Loobuyck, e.a., (red.), *Welke universiteit willen wij (niet)?* Gent, Academia Press, p. 157-161.

Willaert Frank, 2013. "Can we fall in love again? A testimony", www.ethicalforum.be/downloads/2013.

Willems Dominique, 2010. "Het professoraat anno 2010. Koorddansen tussen Bologna en Lissabon", KVAB, General assembly, December 2010, www.ethicalforum.be/downloads/2013.

Composition of the working group

Herman DE DIJN (KMW)

Irina VERETENNICOFF (KNW)

Dominique WILLEMS (KMW)

Yvan BRUYNSERAEDE (KNW)

Willem ELIAS (KK)

Hilde HEYNEN (KTW)

Monica HÖFTE (KTW)

Maximiliaan MARTENS (KK)

Noël SALAZAR (JA)

Jo TOLLEBEEK (KMW)

Els VAN DAMME (KMW)

Dirk VAN DYCK (KNW)

Luc VANQUICKENBORNE (KNW)

Frank WILLAERT (KANTL)

Jacques WILLEMS (KTW)

KNW = Klasse Natuurwetenschappen van de Academie (the Academy's Class of Natural Sciences)
KMW = Klasse Menswetenschappen van de Academie (the Academy's Class of Humanities)
KK = Klasse Kunsten van de Academie (the Academy's Class of Arts)
KTW = Klasse Technische wetenschappen van de Academie (the Academy's Class of Technical Sciences)
KANTL = Koninklijke Academie voor Nederlandse Taal- en Letterkunde (the Academy of Dutch Language
and Literature)
JA = Jonge Academie (Belgian Young Academy)

Acknowledgements