

Multiculturalism – How can Society deal with it?
A Thinking Exercise in Flanders

KVAB Thinkers in residence programme 2017



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Tariq Modood
Frank Bovenkerk

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Preface

GODELIEVE LAUREYS

Chair of the Class of the Humanities

The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts organizes two annual cycles of what is known as the Thinkers programme as part of its service to society. The aim of a Thinkers programme is to deepen the societal debate in Flanders and to develop a long-term vision about relevant topics and current challenges faced by Flanders. The programme is a unique multidisciplinary and future-oriented initiative aiming for high-level social impact.

To this end, one or two highly specialized international scholars are invited to come to Flanders on several occasions in the course of one year or even to reside here for a longer period. As experts in the field, they acquaint themselves with the specific situation in Flanders regarding the topic being studied, they read reports and relevant literature and reflect on the specific features of the Flemish/Belgian case. In a dialogue with members of the Academy and through meetings and encounters with numerous colleagues at the universities, with stakeholders and opinion makers, the Thinkers gradually gain insight into the local situation and reflect on it from an international perspective. Their work results in a position paper that contributes to the further strategic development of Flanders and that offers research-based policy advice to the Flemish authorities. The final report contains an evaluation of the Flemish situation benchmarked by international comparisons and rooted in theoretical and scientific findings. It takes stock of the situation, identifies strengths and weaknesses and formulates recommendations on points that are of particular interest for future policy-making.

The 2017 programme initiated by the Class of the Humanities is aimed at developing a reflection on the subject of multiculturalism. Under the distinguished leadership of the class members Marie-Claire Foblets and Ron Lesthaeghe, two highly qualified scholars were invited to this year's programme. Tariq Modood (Director of the Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, Bristol University) has been studying the phenomenon of multiculturalism at an ideational and symbolic level, whereas Frank Bovenkerk (Cultural anthropologist and criminologist at the University of Utrecht) approaches the subject at a behavioral and interactional level, relying on empirical data. The complementarity of the backgrounds and expertise of these two scholars has been a source of mutual inspiration for both thinkers and has been an avenue to explore the multifaceted concept of multiculturalism in relation to social practices.

After an initial brainstorming with the members of the Steering group, all of them members of the Class of the Humanities of the Academy, the two thinkers each drafted a concept note defining their theoretical stance and developing the

specific points on which they wished to concentrate. Important building blocks in the Thinkers programme have been the fact-finding sessions, the round table discussions with focus groups during site visits at all the Flemish universities, and the bilateral talks with some important stakeholders. All these impressions and thoughts have found their way into two rich and thoughtful position papers, the first draft of which was presented and discussed at a symposium on June 23rd held at the Academy.

I am confident that these two position papers will contribute significantly to the further development of the ongoing debate in Flanders and will shed a new light on this highly relevant topic.

Introduction

MARIE-CLAIRE FOBLETS

Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts, Project coordinator

I. Introduction

For its Thinkers programme of 2017, the Class of the Humanities of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts (KVAB) decided to design a programme around the urgent and politically exceptionally sensitive topic of the multicultural society, under the English title: **Multiculturalism: How can society deal with it?**

The foreign thinkers chosen for the topic of 2017 were professors Tariq Modood (Director of the Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship, Bristol University) and Frank Bovenkerk (Cultural anthropologist and criminologist at the University of Utrecht), who accepted the assignment with enthusiasm. Their contributions are published in this volume, accompanied by this succinct introduction that gives us the opportunity to offer a brief explanation of the choice of the topic of multiculturalism (II.: About the topic), the specific task that the thinkers were given, and the working method used for this programme (III.: The assignment and the course of the activities). This is followed by a consideration, albeit in very summary form, of the way the two thinkers went about the task, so as to draw lessons for the future from the thinking exercise that was proposed to them, and to make a few concrete suggestions (IV.: What are the lessons learned?).

It can already be said that the exercise has turned out to be very instructive, even if the topic of the multicultural society in Flanders is of course far too extensive to be treated exhaustively within a single thinkers programme. That this would be the case was clear from the outset. In its activities in the coming years, however, the KVAB will continue to devote attention to the burning question of the increasing religious, ethnic and cultural diversity and to the way in which this diversity is not only reshaping Flemish society but calls ever more urgently on science and on the responsibility of researchers.

II. About the topic

Much ink has been spilt in recent years on the topic of the multicultural society and its chances of success within the liberal democracies in Europe. The same is true in Flanders. As regards the chances of success, opinions vary widely, and what makes the debate even more complex is the observation that the underlying reasons for the growing diversity are linked on the one hand to internal social dynamics, such as the growing secularization and the increasingly intense

individualization of lifestyles, two developments that are closely related to the rise of human rights. On the other hand, it is also the consequence of the growing ethnic, cultural and religious/philosophical diversity of European societies, which is also directly related to migration from outside the European Union. Over the past three decades, these migratory movements have increasingly resulted from rampant pauperization worldwide, global injustice between rich and poor countries, war and, more recently, also growing climate change. It is this link, in particular, to migration that has in recent years rendered discussion of the future of our multicultural society all the more sensitive. This is so not least because humanitarian migration, in particular, has often been seen in public opinion as undesirable and a threat to the achievements of the active welfare state. The willingness to making a commitment to respecting this new diversity is thus relatively low, prompting caution in addressing the subject.

This particular constellation of factors, as a result of which diversity can be seen as arising from increased attention to individual self-determination within one's own society, combined with migration from outside for which we are not (adequately) prepared, has in the last few years driven an increasingly apparent wedge between those who see diversity not only as a challenge but a true enrichment, and those who on the contrary emphasize the many societal risks posed by uncontrolled demographic shifts. The points requiring attention vary widely between these two perspectives. Whereas the first group draws on the values and norms enshrined in binding international conventions and in national constitutions – including fundamental rights and freedoms – to find concrete pathways for guaranteeing the participation of new minorities, the second group, by contrast, emphasizes the importance of enhanced controls, including both police action and border control, and call for efforts at prevention.

To understand the complexity that marks current debates about multicultural society, with all the tensions that this topic evokes, it is important not to limit oneself to just one of those two visions, but rather, to examine closely as many perspectives as possible, both of those who focus on the chances of success of the multicultural society and seek ways to enhance those chances, and of those who see it as their task to consider the risks and assess them as accurately as possible. The KVAB's Thinkers programme of 2017, of which this publication is the written outcome, can be seen as an attempt to provide a forum for two very different types of expertise in diversity in contemporary multicultural society. The programme thus served as an opportunity to make available to the KVAB the experience that two foreign scholars have built up over the years in the course of their research. This publication, aimed at a wider audience, is intended to offer these scholars' insights as potential source of inspiration for the debates that we are currently engaged in, and in Flanders in particular, about the way in which the new diversity could be integrated as peacefully as possible into the daily reality of our society. The two contributions are not to be understood as polar opposites, but rather as complementary reflections.

III. The assignment and the course of the activities

For the Thinkers programme of 2017, as mentioned, the two invited foreign scholars are professors Tariq Modood and Frank Bovenkerk.

For the sake of clarity: the two experts were tasked with making a contribution to the programme, each within his own field of expertise, that draws connections with the realities of Flemish society and then to formulate some policy recommendations that could offer an effective response to the questions facing the multicultural society of today and tomorrow, in Brussels and Flanders.

To help the thinkers with this task, the KVAB's Class of the Humanities set up a select Steering Group: Godelieve Laureys (chair), Batja Mesquita, Jaak Billiet, Herman De Dijn, Koen Matthijs, Ron Lesthaeghe, Kristiaan Versluys, Karel Velle (ex officio) and Freddy Dumortier (also ex officio) and the author of this preface. Ms Inez Dua, policy staff member, provided administrative support to the work.

In the period between September 2016 and June 2017, various multiday visits to Flanders and Brussels took place, including a three-day visit in January 2017 to the four major Flemish universities (Leuven, Brussels, Ghent and Antwerp). Between 16 and 20 January 2017, the two thinkers had the opportunity to conduct in-depth conversations with researchers from each of these universities. The participating researchers were asked as far as possible to assist both thinkers in their task, with particular attention to the topics of greatest interest to each, so as to help them to form a more concrete image of the way in which these topics are approached in Flanders and to identify where precisely the greatest difficulties lie. The researchers who took part in the conversations then made available a selection of their publications to the secretariat of the KVAB (two publications per researcher). A contact person at each university was asked to prepare and coordinate the meetings (UA: Christiane Timmerman; KU Leuven: Orhan Agirdag; UGent: Ilse Derluyn; VUB: Steven De Ridder). The visit to these four Flemish universities yielded, according to both thinkers, a very rich "fact-finding" visit that enabled them to gain a clearer image of the situation of scientific research in Flanders on the topic of the multicultural society. What they found striking in the process, according to one of their remarkable (interim) conclusions, is how the issues that are closely linked to the struggle for Flemish identity and its preservation continue to this day to mark the approach to the future of Flemish society and its increasing demographic, cultural, religious/philosophical and ethnic diversity.

That visit was followed, in March 2017, by a two-day meeting within a more restricted circle, to which specialists – both scholars and practitioners – were invited.¹ The two thinkers also met each other several times in Bristol, and on

¹ The following persons presented at these discussions (listed in alphabetical order): Orhan Agirdag (KU Leuven); Omar Ba (Afrika Platform); Bambi Ceuppens (Museum Midden-Afrika, Tervuren);

23 June 2017 they participated into a public discussion based on a first, interim version of their report, at the premises of the KVAB. The aim of that meeting was to provide professors Modood and Bovenkerk with an opportunity to present their findings to a wider group of interested persons and gather responses which they could draw upon when finalizing their text. And they have done just that.²

IV. What are the lessons learned?

An introduction is not the place to anticipate the contents of the contributions that follow, much the less to comment on the conclusions which the authors have drawn from their findings. But since the formula of the Thinkers programme, as set out by the KVAB, is intended in part to yield recommendations that can subsequently arouse ideas for developing a long-term vision to serve as a basis of future policy, it can be useful to highlight here some of the suggestions that flow from the thinkers' reports and that certainly appear sufficiently relevant to fulfil that function, and to show how the two thinkers arrived at their respective recommendations.

As noted, the thinkers of the 2017 programme were given complete freedom to choose the specific focus of their respective analyses, taking as their starting point the findings that they themselves identified as sufficiently important to merit attention. The distinctive feature of an external perspective is that it often places the emphasis on different aspects of reality than insiders do, either because the latter take those aspects for granted, or they try consciously or unconsciously to deny them. Even where insiders acknowledge certain issues to be problematic, they may do so in a way that is different from the view of an outsider. In this exercise, the process resulted in two very different approaches: both equally valuable for the purposes of the Thinkers programme, but difficult to compare to each other.

In his contribution, Tariq Modood builds further on the finding that in Flanders, "(...) the vast majority of school students, 75% at secondary and 62% at primary (...)", are enrolled in state-funded schools with a Roman Catholic identity, and for many

Naima Charkaoui (Minority forum); Patrick Charlier (UNIA); Noël Clycq (UA-Cemis); Jozefien De Leersnyder (KU Leuven); Nadia Fadil (KU Leuven); Leni Franken (UA); Annalisa Gadaleta (city councillor in Molenbeek); Elias Hemelsoet (public schools); Emma Jaspaert (KU Leuven); Koen Lemmens (KU Leuven); François Levrau (UA); Karen Phalet (KU Leuven); Iris Philips (catholic schools); Piet Van Avermaet (UGent); Floor Verhaeghe (UGent); Jean-Pierre Verhaeghe (Minority forum); Jogchum Vrielink (KU Leuven).

² Since the thinkers could not be expected to consult, from abroad, all available sources and/or to continue to follow all the developments, a number of colleagues were willing to serve as reviewers for the texts that Tariq Modood and Frank Bovenkerk were asked to submit after 23 June 2017. These were, on behalf of the steering group: Batja Mesquita (KU Leuven) and Jaak Billiet (KU Leuven), and the experts Jozefien De Leersnyder (KU Leuven), Stefaan Pleysier (KU Leuven) and Mieke Van Houtte (UGent).

that is not the identity in which they are brought up at home. As a result, school principals, teachers and educators are faced with delicate pedagogical dilemmas. This reality was unfamiliar to Modood, and he sought to draw parallels with the UK and develop his insights on the basis of that comparison. The recommendations he formulates invite for a thorough rethinking of the designated learning outcomes, as they currently apply to state-funded school education in Flanders, suggesting that besides the teaching of religion (religious instruction), where applicable, pupils would also be offered a chance to familiarize with religious and philosophical diversity (religious education).

In the case of Frank Bovenkerk, the starting point of his analysis is the finding that there are scarcely any statistics available for our country that would make it possible to investigate in detail the link between people's origins or their immigrant background and their criminal profiles. He was surprised to discover this, for he sees a sharp contrast with the situation in neighbouring countries. Therefore he decided to conduct his own study of the situation, based on first-hand sources, which he gathered by speaking with respondents who deal with crime in various capacities. He spoke, among others, with municipal officials, aldermen, community workers and residents. He decided to do so in areas with a high concentration of residents with a migrant profile. As noted above, he focused his efforts on the Brussels borough of Molenbeek and on the city of Mechelen. In effect, he conducted a contrast study and, although the findings are based on qualitative data and thus not to be considered as representative, they did make possible a number of apt observations that Bovenkerk found solid enough to prompt a number of very practical suggestions that could help reduce the significant tensions that currently mark the relationships between law enforcement and local communities and seem, at least at first sight, to make the situation hopeless.

Different emphases and different research methods for undertaking the task, as well as different topics explain why the 2017 Thinkers programme on the multicultural society in Flanders has resulted in not one but two reports, each with a series of recommendations that deserve to be considered on their merits.

Tariq Modood is a highly regarded political scientist who has over the years also come to be known as a public intellectual whose name in the United Kingdom is associated with questions about cultural and religious/philosophical diversity. He is also one of the most widely cited theorists of multiculturalism. It is therefore no surprise that he took the opportunity of the mandate the KVAB entrusted him with to offer a number of recommendations concerning national identity and to explain his own ideas about what in his view qualifies as moderate secularism and how it applies to the local context in Flanders. More concretely, he opted to investigate the extent to which his approach to multiculturalism could be of service to the debates under way here in Flanders as to how diversity in religion and worldviews is and should be taught in schools. He engaged in contacts with various authors who have addressed this topic in Flanders in recent years, and read publications by them which are available in English. In his contribution to this volume, he

offers an analysis of what he gleaned both from the scholarly literature and from the conversations he was able to engage in with scholars as well as practitioners during his visits in January and March 2017.

Why, one might ask, did Modood opt to give a prominent place in his analysis to the sensitive issue of the way in which religion and belief are addressed at school? That choice is intrinsically connected to his conviction that in a multicultural society, a government that seeks to inculcate the ideas of liberal democracy is also responsible for guaranteeing minorities - including religious ones - their rightful place when it comes to planning for the future of society. Young people need to be prepared for that future, and religious freedom is not only a matter of protecting those who may hold a majority in parliament; "(...) multiculturalism requires allowing minority needs to be supported even if they run counter to majority preferences, as long as they do not harm anybody". For Tariq Modood, education, and especially state-funded education, plays a key role in this regard. He argues *against* the position that is satisfied with the guarantee of government neutrality with regard to the way in which religious subjects are taught, in particular in denominational (Catholic) schools. On the contrary, he calls for a formula that helps pupils think in two different ways about religious questions: via religious instruction, the classic instruction in one or other faith heritage, and religious education, which is intended to give pupils the possibility of learning at school about religions other than their own. Each of the two forms has its own function, and the two are complementary: in Modood's vision, the objective should be to help pupils learn to position themselves as future adults between, on the one hand, the choice of their own religious belief and, on the other, respect for other forms of belief. To make the latter possible, acquiring sufficient knowledge of religions other than one's own is not only desirable but, for Modood, a *sine qua non*. With his suggestion, Modood counters the view that classic religious instruction can simply be replaced by a school subject that is oriented more towards familiarizing pupils with religious and philosophical diversity. Modood elaborates a threefold proposal: *first*, "(...) proper religious education should be a compulsory school subject in all publically funded schools, namely to improve religious literacy for all, an understanding of the different faith/worldviews and an understanding of the good and the bad that religion can contribute in the lives of individuals and in society"; *second*, "(...) confessional religious education - and also collective worship - should not be a compulsory requirement in public schools but should be available for any of the seven recognised religions/worldviews on school premises if a significant number of parents and/or pupils request it", and *third*, "Confessional schools should be free to make religious instruction and worship arrangements that they believe reflect the mission of the school but they must allow exemptions when these are required".³ The proposals made by Tariq Modood, reflecting his

³ In Modood's view, one such exemption would be the concern in larger cities, where many Muslim pupils attend Catholic schools and/or where the majority of parents from Catholic background are no longer practicing the religion.

notion of moderate secularism, go against those who aim to impose a liberal neutrality on the Belgian state. Modood resists the latter endeavour in favour of recognition of religious identities and inclusivity. Such a position is sure to give rise to the question how the concept of 'neutrality' is to be understood as regards the role of the government in defining diversity of belief. To Modood, the Belgian constitution does not reflect neutrality, but rather a moderate secularism. He defends Belgium's moderate secularism against liberal neutralist critiques, arguing that it needs to be multiculturalised, rather than 'neutralised'.

Modood has many years' experience in the study of issues involving multicultural society. He makes a suggestion, not with a view to pushing it through at all costs; rather, his recommendations are in line with his conviction that in a liberal democracy, the aim must always be to keep three essential aspects in balance: (1) identity, recognition and distinctive ethno-religious needs; (2) equality, inclusion and national belonging; (3) the public/national good. Modood does not seek to take a position within the debate on religious freedom in this country, but offers a view of the issue that is worthy of further in-depth discussion, if only because he analyses the importance of religion from a minority standpoint.

Frank Bovenkerk, in his work as a criminologist, seeks to trace the genesis of certain behavioural patterns that give rise to crime, focused on the question of the extent to which migration – direct or indirect – may be correlated with crime rates. This is a topic on which he has been working for many years. In so doing, he does not shy away from taking a close look at hard figures and realities, relying – always very scrupulously – on scientifically founded data. He is not anything but a popularizer. His scientific research has earned him great respect in the Netherlands. The starting point for his analysis, as mentioned above, is the glaring lack of statistics for Belgium that would make it possible to determine whether or not there is a link between migration and crime rates. His surprise at the lack of data is all the greater since, as Bovenkerk notes, the notion that serious crime and, more recently, terrorism are connected to unbridled migration continues to be widely held in this country as well.

Bovenkerk's contribution results in a series of recommendations that can be seen in a number of different ways. His surprise at the lack of statistics that would allow closer study of potential links between migration and criminal behavioural patterns can be understood indirectly as a hint that better information may make it possible to pursue more targeted policies. He goes on to offer a number of pathways that, while taken individually are not new, but when taken together constitute an invitation to choose a different approach: Bovenkerk warns, among other things, against the deleterious effects of ethnic profiling in police action which leaves certain groups within the population with the sense that they are being specially targeted ("In proactive police work, ethnic profiling can be defined as a tendency to disproportionately stop and search people based on their visible ethnic or

racial features with no reasonable justification"). He also calls for attention to the glaring problem of structural socio-economic discrimination, which is an obstacle to its victims' moving up in society. If certain groups within the population are consistently disadvantaged as compared to others, this can over time become a breeding ground for delinquent behaviour: "The issue of inequality before the law is a high priority on the research agenda all over, and in Europe, technically excellent studies demonstrate the effects of discrimination (...). To combat this inequality, more uniform criteria for sentencing are recommended, be that at the expense of the judges' decision-making discretion". Bovenkerk thus sees combating socio-economic structural discrimination as a top priority for public policy. He also makes suggestions that should over the medium term give rise to a change in mentalities: providing suitable training for those who are preparing to work in law enforcement, making public servants and police officers better acquainted with the traditions, religious beliefs and worldview that new minorities within society bring with them from their upbringing, working with multicultural police teams. ("Much more thought needs to be put into community policing, with police officers who invest time and energy in building a relationship with the local residents"; (...) There are numerous advantages to setting up multicultural Police and Justice Departments. It can be an eye-opener for police officers or district attorneys to work side by side as equals with colleagues whose ethnic background is the same as that of the community over which they have oversight and see on the streets or in the courtroom as suspects on a daily basis. This gives them an opportunity to acquire cultural expertise that can help them evaluate the conduct of perpetrators and victims"), pursuing an appointments policy that enables more judges with an immigrant background to serve on the bench, etc.

Each and every one of these measures is an intrinsic part of an inclusive policy that is attentive to cultural, ethnic and religious/philosophical diversity, but at the same time is highly demanding and mutually complementary, and must thus be seen as essential supports for a firm commitment by policy-makers to fostering full participation in social life, particularly by members of hitherto disadvantaged groups within the population.

For Bovenkerk as a criminologist, the key to success lies in a fundamentally different approach to criminality. He identifies four conditions that in his view need to be met to enable such approach: "(1) Minority groups need to be granted equal status (recruits with an immigration background should not solely be hired for the simplest jobs). (2) They work toward common goals (combating crime or preventing terrorism). (3) These efforts have the support of the authorities and (4) the law only works in hierarchic organizations like a police force if the people in charge all the way up to the cabinet ministers support the policy".

Two thinkers, two areas of expertise, two visions. Other scholars would doubtless have had other emphases. The topic of the Thinkers programme for 2017 announces

merely the beginning of a policy that will henceforth be a more systematic point of focus for the KVAB, not only when drawing up its calendar of activities but also in helping to develop an intellectual climate concerning issues that concern the future of our society: Flanders is becoming an irreversibly multicultural society, and attention to an analysis of that complex reality must from now on be an absolute priority for scholars as well, to be regarded not only as the hot-button issue of the day but as a lasting, new context for their work.

Multicultural Nationalism, Political Secularism and Religious Education¹

TARIQ MODOOD
University of Bristol

Executive Summary

The report deploys two concepts: *multicultural nationalism* and *moderate secularism*.

Multicultural Nationalism

- Multiculturalism is not opposed to integration but emphasizes the importance of respecting diverse identities. It should be understood as a mode of integration, just as assimilation is a mode of integration.
- Minority integration in various sectors such as education or housing is not full integration without some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole – a sense of belonging and with the acceptance by the majority that you are a full member of society with the right to feel that you belong.
- The distinctive goal of multicultural nationalism is to allow people to hold, adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their being national co-citizens and members of socio-cultural, ethno-racial and ethno-religious groups.
- Multiculturalist policies were initiated in Flanders in the late 1990s and have been strengthened since, and this should be continued. The policy of 'citizenship trajectories' centred around language and Flemish/Belgian society classes and skills training targeted at non-citizens and prospective citizens risks being too coercive. It would not be appropriate to carry the compulsion over to citizens.
- Flanders/Belgium has been slow to re-think and re-make its national identities so that the minorities can see themselves as and be fully accepted as Flemish

¹ This is a much shortened version of chapters 2 and 4 from Tariq Modood and Frank Bovenkerk, 'Multiculturalism: How Can Society Deal With It?', presented to the conference of the Thinkers Programme of the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts, 23 June, 2017, available at <http://www.kvab.be/activiteiten/multiculturalism-how-can-society-deal-it>. I thank the Academy (KVAB) for this much appreciated opportunity to bring to bear my thinking on multiculturalism with aspects of the ethno-religious diversity in Flanders, and the Programme Steering Committee for the practical and intellectual assistance to enable that. I have enormously benefitted from a large number, too numerous to mention, of researchers in Flanders for discussing the matters in question with me. Some of them are thanked by being cited and discussed in the body of the text; many could not be cited as their contributions were outside the remit of this report and some of them are thanked in footnote 6. I would also like to thank my co-'denker' in residence, Frank Bovenkerk, with whom I enjoyed working

and Belgian. **The key recommendation** therefore is: it is incumbent at both state and sub-state levels, and upon opinion-formers, not to encourage mono-nationalist identities but to favour bi-national or multi-national identities, woven in public dialogues or multilogues, which are inclusive of minority identities in a respectful way.

- Open and plural national identities bring together groups who perceive each other negatively, do not trust or respect each other and create a shared conception of a national people, a new, internally plural 'We'. Those who are most concerned with societal fragmentation, segregation, 'ghetto mentalities' and so on should be actively promoting not just a nationalism, not just a multiculturalism but a multicultural nationalism, or more fittingly for Flanders/Belgium, a multicultural bi-nationalism. Without working toward such imaginative 'macro-symbolic' ideas, large sections of minorities will be or remain alienated and act alienated, perpetuating existing divisions and a lack of inter-generational integration.

Moderate Secularism

- Moderate secularism is a form of political secularism, as in Belgium, based on the relative, not absolute separation of religion and state, on freedom of religion but with the state being involved in eliciting the public good that comes from organised religion.
- The stereotyping of Muslims means 'racialising' them, treating Muslims as if they were a single racial or quasi-racial group, similar to the racialisation of Jews that marks antisemitism. Thus, 'racialisation' is part a feature of ethno-religious diversity today.
- Moreover, the meaning of religion varies between religions, in particular between Christians and non-Christians, or between being a member of a majority or a minority religion: for Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, religion is not just about belief but also sometimes primarily about community and cultural heritage or identity, including resisting stereotypes about one's own community or discriminatory treatment.
- Furthermore, most religions require the observance of rules of piety, and western Europe is experiencing such practice-based religions re-entering the public space – Muslim dress being the most visible and contentious example – after quite a long period in which such forms of religion had eroded away or been transformed into private belief. Institutions and areas of public life which have given up the need to accommodate Christians are now having to adjust to the needs of minority faiths.
- Adaptations of codes of dress or uniforms, or provision of vegan, vegetarian, kosher and halal meals, places for worship and time off to use them are the kinds of requests being made upon state institutions, universities, employers and so on even *when no parallel provision exists for Christians and is not being requested by Christians*. This practice-based accommodation is a

significant multiculturalist challenge because it is not simply a matter of granting minorities provisions already enjoyed by the majority but a matter of respecting minority religions in ways that Christians may be indifferent to in relation to their own faith.

- Learning together about different faiths and humanism, including what they have in common (religious education, RE) and – separately - being instructed in or inducted into one's faith community heritage (RI) as a normal school occurrence and not something excluded from the school community are two mutually balancing aspects of multiculturalism.
- State-funded confessional schools should be free to make RI and worship arrangements that they believe reflect the mission of the school, but they must allow exemptions when these are requested (but not from non-confessional RE).
- Catholic dialogue and 'colourful' approaches to Catholic religious education are to be welcomed but are forms of RI and so not a substitute for proper religious education (RE), which should be a compulsory school subject in all publicly funded schools.
- It should be a matter of priority that teacher training colleges and university departments design suitable courses for existing teachers (including those who need assistance to teach RE after years of having only taught RI) and for a new generation of trainee teachers.
- Without instituting a quota, a stipulation that schools in receipt of public funds have to show that they have made an effort to recruit pupils (say 25% of the school roll) who do not profess the faith identity of the school should be considered.
- I commend state schools allowing students to be absent on up to six holy days of all religious denominations recognized by the Belgian Constitution.
- Flanders lacks accurate data on membership of religious communities, especially in relation to Muslims. I recommend that Flanders/Belgium should consider including a question on religion in the census (with appropriate legislative changes). This will display true levels of social disadvantage of minorities, better planning of public provision of schools, hospitals, local urban regeneration and so on, whilst allowing groups to be recognized in terms of a preferred identity (e.g., religion over national origins).

Introduction

I would be gratified if what I offer here can be of value to minority-community organisations, egalitarian campaign groups and agencies, to Flemish civil society, opinion-formers and policy-makers. My experience in Britain has been that innovative, theory-led engagements directed at relevant publics (and not just policy-makers) and presented in carefully argued yet accessible language can bring about real change. If the argument has resonance with the publics I have in mind they will take it up and it will become part of the public debate from which,

where there is political will and opportunity, real change can emerge. Some of the topics I discuss lie within the competences of the government of Flanders and some of Belgium but in each case public debate and political campaigns in Flanders can make a difference.

The purpose of the report, then, is to contribute to or assist to initiate public debates in Flanders. To this end I deploy two of my concepts: *multicultural nationalism* and *moderate secularism* in relation to ethno-religious diversity in Flanders.

In relation to the first I focus on national identity; in relation to the second I focus primarily but not exclusively on religious education in state-funded faith schools and non-faith schools.

The distinctive goal of multicultural nationalism is to allow people to hold, adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their being national co-citizens and members of socio-cultural, ethnoracial and ethnoreligious groups. Other approaches may be enough to ensure non-discrimination and non-coercive assimilation, but multicultural nationalism goes beyond that to emphasise respect for post-immigration group identities. It also aims to support, not oppose, those for whom their national identity or national identities are important as long as these identities be internally pluralised, made more inclusive and allow for hyphenated national identities such as Flemish-Belgium or Belgian-Moroccan.

'Moderate secularism' is a form of political secularism, as in Belgium, based on the relative, not absolute separation of religion and state, on freedom of religion but with the state being involved in eliciting the public good that comes from organised religion, including schools.

I draw on a number of principles, including that the needs of minorities should not simply be understood in terms of majority preferences: just because the majority does not want something (eg., to display faith through dress), it does not mean there should not be institutional provision for it if a minority strongly feels it needs it and it is not harming anyone. Children learning together about different faiths, including what they have in common and – separately – being instructed in or inducted into one's faith community heritage as a normal school occurrence and not something excluded from the school community are two mutually balancing aspects of multiculturalism within moderate secularism.

Modes of Integration and Multicultural Nationalism

The need for integration arises when an established society is faced with some people who are perceived and treated unfavourably by standard members of that society (and typically the former also perceive themselves as 'different', though not necessarily or at all in a negative way). This may relate to various areas or sectors of society and policy, such as employment, education, housing and so on. It, however, also has a subjective and symbolic dimension, which has a more general or macro character: how a minority is perceived by the rest of the

country and how members of a minority perceive their relationship to society as a whole (Modood, 2012a; Clycq and Levrau, 2017). Sectoral integration, even when achieved in a number of sectors, is not full integration without some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole – what the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain called ‘a sense of belonging’ (CMEB 2000: Introduction) – and with the acceptance by the majority that you are a full member of society with the right to feel that you belong. Hence, it has been rightly said by a Commission on these topics in Quebec, ‘the symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the Other, collective memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material framework’ (Bouchard and Taylor 2008; see also Bouchard 2011). This is particularly so because the current sense of crisis about multiculturalism and integration is operating at this macro-symbolic level. This is evident when one considers how few are the policies that could be said to be about integration, or how small the funds involved are compared to the headline importance that the issues regularly achieve. In thinking about a general ethos or policy orientation at a national level, it is therefore important to engage at this macro-symbolic level.

Multiculturalism is not opposed to integration but emphasizes the importance of respecting diverse identities. It should be understood as a mode of integration, just as assimilation is a mode of integration (Modood, 2012a). Let us consider two variations of multiculturalism, which offer alternative interpretations of the role of a majority culture in the national citizenship. The first position is that of liberal nationalism and argues that the existing national identity of a liberal democratic country cannot be reduced to political institutions and a public sphere, or what is sometimes referred to as a civic national identity but requires a cultural component consisting of a language, a history, ways of thinking and ways of living (Tamir, 1995; Miller, 1995). These cultural dimensions cannot be detached from a sense of peoplehood or country and is essential to the solidarity that underpins a liberal democratic national identity, common welfare, willingness to pay tax to help one’s fellow citizens and common public services and to all other aspects of social justice (Miller, 1995; Kymlicka, 2001). It follows therefore that this foundational or national culture is also necessary for multiculturalism and so multiculturalism must not so loosen these bonds of belonging and mutual identification without which appeals to national identity are not strong enough to call for individuals to be concerned for the good of the whole.

The second variation of multiculturalism is Quebecan interculturalism (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008; Bouchard, 2011; Taylor, 2012).² It distinguishes itself from Canadian multiculturalism by alleging the latter believes that all cultures are

² There are other variations of interculturalism, those which reduce the role of national belonging by focusing on the local, especially cities, and/or the transnational, and so are best covered as forms of cosmopolitanism (Modood, 2012a; see also Meer and Modood, 2012; Meer, Modood and Zapata-Barrero, 2016).

equal and none is more Canadian than another in the eyes of the state, while Quebec, however, is and must continue to be committed to the preservation of its foundational Francophone culture. Hence all cultures are not equal, one of them is the ground upon which all others must be accommodated.

One common ground between these two positions and multiculturalism more generally is that each assumes that the liberal state is not culturally neutral – all states support a certain language(s), a religious calendar in respect of national holidays, the teaching of religion(s) in schools and/or the funding of faith schools, certain arts, sports and leisure activities and so on.³ If so, that means that the majority culture already has recognition of some sort – that is what is meant by saying the liberal state is not neutral. For multiculturalism, it is a matter of extending this valued condition to minorities. Liberal democratic states may promote a national culture (within liberal limits and respecting other group identities) and this would be of benefit to the society or polity as a whole. This follows from the core of my advocacy of multiculturalism, which puts a special value on identity. Appeals to majority cultural heritage cannot be described as illegitimate *per se*. The multiculturalist point is that the predominance that the cultural majority enjoys in the shaping of the national culture, symbols and institutions should not be exercised in a non-minority accommodating way. So, the liberal nationalist goal is legitimate but it should be recognized that the constraints are not just about traditional liberal freedoms of the individual. The latter may be enough to ensure non-discrimination and non-coercive assimilation, but multiculturalism goes beyond that to emphasise respect for post-immigration ethnoracial, ethnocultural and ethnoreligious group identities. This respect is both a constraint on the kind of national cultural identity building that may be pursued and, more positively, it is an opportunity for creating a certain kind of national identity, namely one which is not just constrained by those kinds of group identities but includes them in the revised or reformed national identity, critically reforming but without displacing the narrative of the majority within the national identity. Minorities may wish to contest dominant narratives which exclude them or fail to respect them and their contribution but they do not compete with the majority in a zero-sum game. The process should be seen as a kind of egalitarian levelling up, not a form of dispossession (Modood 2003). More positively, going beyond liberal nationalism towards what we might call '**multicultural nationalism**', the accommodation of minorities should not be seen as a drag on the national identity but as a positive

³ Loobuyuk and Sinardet, 2017 argue that liberal nationalists' support for a thin national identity does not compromise state neutrality: 'The state can implement nation building policies without any interference with state neutrality, because the national identity has nothing to do with ethnicity, religion, or a common way of life' (p.389). Rather, '[t]he national identity is open, based on a common language, public sphere, and historical consciousness, and shared media and political institutions' (p. 389). It is not clear how the latter has 'nothing to do with ethnicity, religion, or a common way of life'. In any case, it is clearly not neutral between languages, histories and a sense of peoplehood.

resource; not as diluting the national culture but vivifying and enriching it. Whilst liberal nationalism is often offered in relation to facilitating the solidarity that enables social democratic redistribution of resources, the distinctive goal of multicultural nationalism is to allow people to hold, adapt, hyphenate, fuse and create identities important to them in the context of their being national co-citizens and members of socio-cultural, ethnoracial and ethnoreligious groups. In some ways this brings multicultural nationalism closer to Quebecan interculturalism but the crucial distinction is that while multicultural nationalism recognizes the legitimacy of the recognition of majority culture, it denies that the majority has the right to deny the accommodation of minorities simply because it runs counter to majority culture or majority preferences and does not breach any liberal democratic rights. The majority and the minorities should stand in a dialogical relationship, in a two-way or multi-way adaptation, in which both the majority or the minorities may seek to have their core cultural identities preserved; neither has a unilateral right to impose this exclusively upon the other in a way that the other identity is not allowed to co-exist.

There is one other complication that is pertinent here. Integration is not only about fusing minority and national identities; sometimes competing national identities are involved. This is most relevantly the case with multi-national states such as Belgium or Britain or Canada, where state-level national identities may compete with sub-state national identities. Writing of Quebec, Catalonia, Scotland and Flanders, Will Kymlicka writes: 'In these cases, sub-state regional governments, often in the hands of nationalist parties, have adopted immigrant integration policies that encourage immigrants to think of themselves, not as postnational Canadians, Spaniards, Britons or Belgians, but as members of a Quebecois, Catalan, Scottish or Flemish nation, and as participants in projects of sub-state nation-building (Kymlicka 2011: 294). He is aware that this is often a reaction because 'the dominant group in a multinational state may use immigration as a deliberate tool to weaken the claims of historic minorities. This was arguably the case in Canada and Belgium until the 1970s, or in Israel today. The central state encourages immigrants to identify with, and integrate into, the hegemonic national group – to ally themselves with English Canada, Francophone Belgium, or Jewish Israel – and thereby strengthen the hand of these dominant groups in contestations against their French, Flemish or Arab sub-state nationalist movements' (Kymlicka 2011: 290).⁴ Neither is a satisfactory situation from the point of view of multicultural and hyphenated identities. No doubt in different nations within a multinational state there will be some ambiguity and contradiction in the national identity and other identities that are prevalent and this will affect new citizens and ethnic minorities. Different individuals and groups will move in different directions, certainly have different emphases but unless there is to be only a federation of separate national

⁴ Kymlicka is not saying that this is still true today in all the states listed here. He thinks it was true of Belgium till the 1970s.

communities tied together by a state organisation, or secession, it is incumbent at both state and sub-state levels to not encourage mono-nationalist identities and to favour bi-national or multi-national identities.

Multiculturalism in Flanders

Beginning with Jacobs 2004 a series of articles has argued that Flanders has developed a form of political multiculturalism; whilst it was mainly set in place in the period 1988 to 2000, it has continued and been strengthened even while from 2000 onwards there has simultaneously been a policy of 'citizenship trajectories' centered around language and Flemish/Belgium society classes and skills training targeted at non-citizens and prospective citizens. It has been argued that the simultaneous development of these two integration approaches – a multiculturalist and an assimilationist – is not perceived as a contradiction by the majority of the public and politicians of Flanders (Jacobs 2004, Jacobs and Rea 2007, Loobuyck and Jacobs 2010, Adam 2013, Adam and Torrekens 2015, Loobuyck and Sinardet 2017).

From a comparative point of view a value of these analyses is that they show that Flanders is a counter-example to the argument that from the late 1990s multiculturalism has been in retreat across Western Europe (Joppke 2004). Interestingly, Britain too does not fit the 'retreat' thesis (Meer and Modood 2009a, Uberoi and Modood 2013). It is unfortunate that these two critiques of Joppke 2004 have till now been two separate parallel lines, with scholars across the North Sea unaware of the national case on the other side of the water.

It is true that in Flanders from 2000 onwards the above-mentioned citizenship trajectories were introduced and increasingly became prominent, indeed they targeted more groups and became compulsory for some groups. The compulsion element does not sit well with the liberty dimension of multiculturalism (and other modes of integration), though it is important to note that these measures are for non-citizens and prospective citizens; it would not be appropriate to carry the compulsion over to citizens. In any case, the need for government measures to emphasise commonality, a certain civic thickening, is something which multiculturalism recognizes. It can of course be done in different ways, and the feature emphasized in multicultural nationalism is the national identity at macro and group levels, while it is relatively silent on – but not necessarily opposed to – more individual and, say, workplace levels.

These citizenship trajectories have not only not led to any rolling back of the multiculturalist framework, it has seen its reinforcement and expansion: 'for example recognition, in the Flemish compulsory education system, of the right to legitimate absence on festive days of all religious denominations recognized by the Belgian Constitution. Other examples include the establishment of a

mainstreaming of cultural diversity policy in the cultural, sports, youth and media sectors' (Adam 2013: 12). It is true that 'the multiculturalist terminology was removed in 2009' but there has been no policy reversal and the relevant budgets – modest as they are – such as for the Minorities Forum have only risen over time (Adam and Jacobs 2014: 74).

What of the idea of re-making the national identity, a central if often overlooked feature of multiculturalism (Modood, 2012a)? It is quite clear that the sense of cultural nationhood and how it can be squashed has played a large role in the politics of Flanders and Belgium and – in the shape of right-wing parties – has sometimes felt threatened by new minorities and sometimes been xenophobic – as a Flemish 'we' has been valorised and asserted. Paradoxically, the very same sensibility that leads to a more heightened sense of (negative) cultural difference has, when detached from or in reaction to its right-wing manifestation, seems to have led to multiculturalism in Flanders. This particularly stands out, in contrast to Wallonia and the Brussels Region, where there is not such a strong sense of a sub-state regional cultural identity and therefore more (public) cultural blindness and less multiculturalism in relation to the post-immigration minorities. Similarly, a Flemish preoccupation with who 'we' are potentially opens the way to more active engagement with the construction of the 'we' and to remaking a more inclusive 'we'. This is an aspect of multiculturalism that seems to be less developed so far in Flanders compared to say Canada or the United States, or a more near comparison, Britain, or as a sub-state comparison, Scotland (Bond 2017, Meer 2015).⁵ Whilst I was unable to find much literature (in English) on this rather advanced feature of multiculturalism, it is certainly not absent from Flemish discourses:

In 2007, the Flemish liberals (VLD) proposed replacing the term "allochthonous" (allochtoon) – the official term used to describe someone with an immigrant background – with the term "new Fleming". Although this group label is far from hegemonic, it indicates a political elites' concept of a civic Flemish identity that until now has been reserved only for the Belgian identity. Since 2009, the Flemish nationalist party, N-VA, has used this terminology in the description of its annual award to a "new Fleming" who has "contributed by his or her merits to the enrichment of Flanders and is an example for the new Flemings and for Flemings in general" (Adam 2013: 17).

This can be done in a patronising way and may risk alienating minorities but it

⁵ It may also be the case that post-immigration ethnic minorities have not yet enjoyed the level of socio-economic mobility and levels of participation in public and cultural life, and are not as present and visible in the media, academia and politics compared to the other countries mentioned above – all part of sectoral integration and critical to multiculturalism – but that is not the theme of this report. Of course I believe that the two topics of the report, national identity at the macro level and institutionalised moderate secularism, are both important for inclusion in their own right and for their potential to reduce sectoral-level ethnic inequalities.

is clear that the sense of new Flemishness has to be reflected in macro-symbolic ways as well as at the level of policies, especially education. From the perspective of multicultural nationalism, both in relation to ethnicity and religion there needs to be a recognition and space for positive difference, but also the inclusive re-making of a common 'We', the nurturing of a multiculturalist sense of national belonging. Moreover, to recall our brief discussion of multicultural multinationalism above, it is important that the Flemish national identity in general, and as well as in relation to the incorporation of 'new Flemings', should not be mono-nationalist, it must allow, even encourage, Flemings – new and old – to identify with Belgium as well as Flanders in a bi-national or 'nested nationality' way (Miller 1995). There are at least two reasons for this.

Firstly, Loobuyck and Sindardet, summarizing the empirical data from several surveys show that: 'compared with other Belgian citizens, Flemings are less likely to seek social contact with foreigners. They also tend to have a more negative attitude towards the idea of foreign neighbours, especially Muslims (Maddens, Billiet and Beerten, 2000; Billiet, Jaspaert, and Swyngedouw 2012)... Moreover, in Flanders there is a negative relationship between attitudes towards ethnic minorities and Flemish consciousness. The more people feel Belgian, the more open they are towards newcomers (Loobuyck and Sinardet, 2017:23-24). Vanbeselaere and his team have "repeatedly observed that a stronger Flemish identification goes along not only with a more negative attitude towards immigrants but also with a growing approval of discriminatory acts" (Vanbeselaere, Boen, and Meeus 2006: 65).

This reminds me of a similar relationship between the newly emergent ethno-national English consciousness that for example manifested itself in the Leave vote in the Brexit referendum of 2016, especially if they identify more with being English than British (Ashcroft, 2016). Bi-national identifications in these contexts are more open to and conducive of multiculturalism.

The second reason for Flemish-Belgian bi-nationalism is that it is what a lot of Flemings want. 'Research on national-territorial identity feelings (Billiet, Maddens, and Frogner 2006: 916–17; Deschouwer and Sinardet 2010; Deschouwer et al. 2015) shows a majority of citizens still identify in the first place with Belgium. Also a large majority does not consider Flemish or Walloon/francophone identity, on the one hand, and Belgian identity, on the other, to be mutually exclusive' (Loobuyck and Sindardet 2017: 398). An identarian approach must always give some normative weight to the identities that matter to people. That principle is fundamental to multiculturalism, and so it once again supports a bi-nationalism in the context of Flanders.

So multiculturalists can certainly give support for identities such as Flemish, where they are valued and highlighted by their bearers, as long as they are not monistic, exclusive or used to marginalize or stigmatise others, especially ethnic

minorities. The value of open and plural national identities should be obvious: they bring together groups who perceive each other negatively, do not trust or respect each other and create a shared conception of a national people, a new, internally plural 'We'. Those who are most concerned with societal fragmentation, segregation, 'ghetto mentalities' and so on should be actively promoting not just a nationalism, nor just a multiculturalism but a multicultural nationalism, or more fittingly for Flanders-Belgium, a multicultural bi-nationalism. Without working for such imaginative 'macro-symbolic' ideas, a large section of minorities will be or remain alienated and act alienated, perpetuating existing divisions and lack of integration inter-generationally.

Religious Diversity and Secularism

The presence of the new ethno-religious diversity is not simply a challenge for the inclusive/exclusive potential of the national identity. It includes various sectoral-level ethnic inequalities issues across many societal domains, such as employment or in relation to delinquency, crime and terrorism as dealt with by 'co-denker', Frank Bovenkerk. Language seems to be central to ethnic exclusion and majority-minority relations in Flanders, as I learnt from my participation in this Programme. I was impressed by how this was rather well understood in the research community in Flanders, indeed beyond a level that I could hope to add to. One of the most serious challenges, especially because of the presence of Muslims, is for the inclusive/exclusive potential of political secularism, and it is this, concluding with some implications for religious education, that is the second topic of this report.⁶ The challenge is not just demographic, but about claims made concerning shared public spaces, keeping in mind that initially Europeans responded to the post-immigration populations within discourses and policy frameworks of race (Britain), ethnicity (Netherlands), and guest workers (Germany), which were unmindful of the long term religion-secular dimensions of these populations. The majority of this post-immigration ethno-religious population is Muslim, and the shift towards Muslimness was partly facilitated by an evolving and expansive set of identity politics and equality discourses in several countries, and multiculturalism in particular, as well as the way that Muslim populations are growing and settling down in their countries of migration (and birth, for the second and later generations). These trends could be said to be part of a more or less global rise in Muslim consciousness, both in relation to religiosity (including public religiosity), and the rise of Muslim identity or Islamist politics. In Western Europe, events of 1988–89, specifically the Rushdie Affair and l'affaire du foulard, were particularly pivotal (Modood 2012b).

⁶ For oral and written presentations in relation to other dimensions of multicultural equality, most of which cannot be discussed in this report, I am grateful to several presenters during the course of this Programme, such as Piet Van Avermaet, Karen Phalet, Nadia Fadil and Iris Phillips, and especially to those, who in addition to their own presentations, gave me feedback on earlier drafts of this report: Jozefien De Leersnyder, Orhan Agirdag, Marie-Claire Foblets, Ron Lesthaeghe, Godelieve Laureys, Elias Hemelsoet, and Mieke Van Houtte.

What religion really means in this context

While each new generation across the last century seems to be less Christian than its predecessor and so few young people today deem Christianity to be important to their life, this generational indifference is much less amongst post-immigration groups. Indeed, amongst ethnic minorities expressions of commitment amongst the young can be exceptionally high: more than a third of Indians, and two-thirds of Pakistani and Bangladeshi 16-34-year-olds said in a British national survey at the end of the twentieth century that religion was very important to how they led their lives compared to a fifth of Caribbeans and 5 per cent of whites (Modood et al, 1997). In the case of young Muslims, the importance of religion has been rising and overtaking their elders (GfK NOP 2006; see also Mirza et al 2007).

Beyond that, religion has a social importance for minorities. For example, in South Asia, from where the majority of British Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims originate, religious identity has a salience much higher than in Britain, so it is not surprising that during the last few decades religion – rather than say colour or linguistic heritage or national origins – has risen in the individual and community self-identities of these minorities together with their sense of Britishness.⁷ This does not necessarily refer to religiosity but is a recent manifestation of the well-known phenomenon that Jews generally and Catholics in locations like Northern Ireland can call themselves and can be called by others as Jews and Catholics respectively even if they are not religious and may even be anti-religious. We are here clearly talking about group identity or **ethno-religious community membership** not belief.⁸

Even when their terms of choice become prominent (eg., Muslim), what minorities are usually unable to do is to control the meaning of terms. This again is most evident in the recent period in relation to Muslims and Muslim identity or public discourses of Islam. Muslims may have demanded recognition qua Muslims and may have propelled that identity into public discourse and popular consciousness but very few Muslims have sought to have 'Muslim' mean fanatic, fundamentalist, misogynist, separatist or terrorist, though this is what to many 'Muslim' currently connotes in western Europe (Morey and Yaqin, 2011). This stereotyping of Muslims, part of the phenomenon generally called Islamophobia can be understood as 'racialisation'. Not simply because that is what happens to groups designated as

⁷ It is doubtful for example that most South Asians in Britain ever thoughtful of themselves in terms of colour identities such as black or brown as much as some observers thought to be the case (Modood 1994, Modood et al 1997: 291-297). In relation to Britishness see Modood et al 1997: 328-338 and Heath and Demireva 2014.

⁸ Modood, 1998: 378-399. Of course historically speaking it could be said that the Jews were a people who had a religion (which came to be called Judaism) rather than a religious group; the same could perhaps be said of Hindus and Hinduism. The term 'ethnoreligious' here is therefore most apt.

'races', nor even because non-whiteness is closely associated with being a Muslim⁹ but because it is to treat Muslims as if they were a single, racial or quasi-racial group. The dissonance that one might experience here in accepting the idea that a religious group is a 'race' can be eased by considering the general case of how the Jews have been racialized (indeed in continental Europe the Jews are the quintessential race), as well as the specific case of Catholics in Northern Ireland or Muslims in the 'ethnic cleansing' rampages in the former Yugoslavia (Modood, 2005 and Meer and Modood, 2009).¹⁰ Thus 'racialisation' is part of the meaning of ethno-religious diversity.

The meaning of religion, then, can vary between religions, in particular between Christians and non-Christians, or between being a member of a majority or a minority religion: for Jews, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs religion is not just about belief but also sometimes primarily about community and cultural heritage or identity, including resisting stereotypes about one's own community or discriminatory treatment. Yet another way in which religion is not just about belief is that it often requires a public performance or a behaviour e.g., in relation to codes of dress or food, and so is much more publicly visible and sometimes requires adaptation on the part of institutions in order to be accommodated. While this is barely a feature of modern, especially Protestant, Christianity, where 'inner belief' can be considered sufficient and it is often deemed unnecessary, perhaps even inappropriate to display markers, even a cross, of one's faith, this is quite exceptional in global, and now western European terms. Most religions require the observance of rules of piety and western Europe is experiencing such practice-based religions re-entering the public space – Muslim dress being the most visible and contentious example - after quite a long period in which such religion has been eroded away or transformed into private belief. Institutions and areas of public life which have given up the need to accommodate Christians are now having to adjust to the needs of minority faiths, and sometimes stimulating Christian reappraisal of its retreat from public piety (eg, the display of a wearer's cross, as in the Eweida case at the ECHR). Dietary requirements, space for worship, and gender relations, besides dress, are also prominent as elements of religious praxis that institutions such as schools, hospitals and prisons, and even workplaces are being asked to adjust to. Adaptations of codes of dress or uniforms, or provision of vegan, vegetarian, kosher and halal meals, places for worship and time off to use them are the kinds of requests being made upon state institutions, universities, employers and so on even **when no parallel provision exists for Christians and is not being requested for by Christians**. This praxis-based accommodation is a significant multiculturalist challenge because it is not simply

⁹ That 'Muslim' is racially coded (as colour, cultural alienness and not being European) in the way that sometimes Britishness is racially coded as whiteness.

¹⁰ Note however the point made in footnote 9. Jews may be considered as a racialized religious group or as a religionised ethnic group or 'nation'.

a matter of granting minorities provisions already enjoyed by the majority but a matter of respecting minority religions in ways that Christians may be indifferent to in relation to their own faith. And of course it is not just a symbolic recognition that is being requested as substantive provisions or institutional changes are sometimes necessary.

The net result of what I have been describing is that minority religions have come to have a significant – even if contested – public presence (Modood, 2005; Dinham and Lowndes, 2009). Public campaigns for inclusion and equality, conflicts over faith schools, women's dress and gender more generally, not to mention all the issues to do with the 'war on terrorism' and Islamist radicalism, has made religion much more politically prominent and in public affairs generally. Public dialogue, representation and leadership is often sought and realised by those who define themselves in terms of religious community organisations.

Having understood what is meant by speaking of ethno-religious diversity today, especially in relation to the accommodation of its public character I now turn to secularism.

Western European Moderate Secularism

Most people will agree the USA and the USSR (when it existed) are secular states. They are of course very different states; one was a Communist Party dictatorship, the other a liberal democratic container for capitalism. They have, moreover, very different relations with religion. The USSR had a self-declared atheist philosophy and actively suppressed religion, whilst the USA, a country with vigorous and publicly active Christian churches, has a constitutional 'wall of separation' which is actively, if variably, enforced by its Supreme Court. What is it that makes these two states exemplars of political secularism? It clearly cannot be the separation of religion and state (the USSR was active in controlling and persecuting churches, mosques, etc.), and for the same reason it cannot be about freedom of conscience; and nor can it be the idea that religion is a matter of personal, private belief (religion in the USA is a very public matter). I suggest that the core idea of political secularism is the idea of political autonomy, namely that politics or the state has a *raison d'être* of its own and should not be subordinated to religious authority, religious purposes, or religious reasons. This is a one-way type of autonomy. Secularism can be supportive of the autonomy of organised religion and freedom of religion too, as in the USA, but it does not have to be. Autonomy does not mean strict separation of the USA-type. It is consistent with some government control of religion, some interference in religion, some support for religion, and some cooperation with (selected) religious organisations and religious purposes. This is the case in every single West European state, the seed-bed for modern, Western political secularisms. Nevertheless, state control and support of religion must not compromise the autonomy of politics and statecraft: it must be largely justifiable

in political terms, not just in pursuance of religious reasons, and religion must not restrict (but may support) political authority and state action.

For many intellectuals, especially political theorists, secularism or Western secularism is understood in terms of the religious-liberty secularism of the USA and/or the equality of citizenship secularism or *laïcité* of France. An example of this approach is Bhargava (2009), where these two secularisms are described as 'the most dominant and defensible western versions of secularism' and taken jointly are designated 'as the mainstream conception of secularism' (93). As a matter of fact, neither of these models approximates particularly closely to church-state relations amongst West European countries beyond France. In Germany, the Catholic and Protestant Churches are constitutionally recognised corporations, for whom the federal government collects voluntary taxes and grants large amounts of additional public money so that they between them have a larger public welfare budget than the federal state. Norway, Denmark and England each have an 'established' Church, Sweden had one till 2000 and Finland has two (Stepan 2011; cf. Koenig 2009).¹¹ Yet, it would be difficult to dispute that these states are not amongst the leading secular states in the world – more precisely, one could only dispute that if one had some narrow, abstract model of secularism that one insisted on applying to the varieties of empirical cases. So, the question is how are we to characterise the secularisms of Western Europe? I have argued that despite their distinctive histories and institutional diversity that I have referred to, these states can be understood as having evolved what I have called 'moderate secularism' (Modood 2007 and 2010). I sketch this conception in terms of five features:

1. Mutual autonomy, not mutual exclusion or one-sided control.
2. Religion is a public good (or bad), not just a private good (or bad).
3. The national Church or churches (organisers of this public good) belongs to the people and the country, not just to its religious members and clergy.
4. It is legitimate for the state to be involved in eliciting the public good that comes from organised religion, and not just to protect the public good from dangers posed by organised religion.
5. Moderate secularism can take different forms in different times and places, and not all forms of religious establishment should be ruled out without attending to specific cases (Modood, 2017: 356-358).

Before we can begin to consider how moderate secular states should accommodate ethno-religious diversity, we have to face an objection that religion is not an appropriate candidate for multiculturalism. The argument is that religious affiliation is chosen while multicultural identities, like being black or Chinese are 'given'.

¹¹ The UK too has two state recognised national churches, the Church of England and the Church of Scotland but the latter is independent of the UK state, including of the Scottish state in which it plays no formal role.

This, however, is a false distinction. One does not choose to be born a Muslim but being of a Muslim background or being perceived as such can be the basis for a diminished citizenship in just the same way as other bases of identity such as being Black or Chinese. Of course, some Muslims may not want to project a religious identity and may believe that religion is a private matter. Yes, but other Muslims may not. Yet, this is not distinctive to religion but applies equally to, say, blackness or to Moroccan identity, and it also applies to gender and sexuality: multicultural identities have an element of 'givenness', which is not only biological but is socially constructed and ascribed, and they have an element of choice about how one relates to that as a self-identity, in particular in relation to issues of privacy and publicity. However, there is one important implication for religion that should be highlighted. Multiculturalist accommodation of groups is primarily as identity or community based on descent and only secondarily about faith; it is based on recognition and inclusivity, not the truth of doctrines. In so far as doctrine comes in, it does so indirectly, for example, protecting Jews from incitement to hatred may mean protecting them from certain insults to their religion (eg., that they are Christ-killers or their rituals involve the sacrifice of Christian babies), or allowing the community to transmit its identity over generations may require public support for Jewish schools in which Judaism is taught and not just or in addition to the national religion or non-religious ethics.

The first and most basic argument, then, for including religious identities, and specifically for the multiculturalist accommodation of a religious minority is not by a comparative reference to Christians but by reference to equal respect; in so far as there is a comparative reference, the initial comparative reference is to the egalitarian accommodation of women, black people, gays etc. Perhaps the most immediate implication for political secularism is that any political norm that excludes religious identities from the public space, from schools and universities, from politics and nationhood – what I call 'radical secularism', which tries to privatise religion – is incompatible with multicultural citizenship. If religious identities face this kind of exclusion but not identities based on race, ethnicity, gender and so on, then there is a bias against religious identity and a failure to practice equality between identities or identity groups. When groups protest against such forms of exclusion, as Muslims have been doing, we should identify what they are asking for and consider whether it is reasonable, and here the argument has too soon become contextual. Do we normally grant such things to groups? If we do, is there a reason to not continue to do so or to not pluralise it? Conversely, if we do not normally grant such things, is there a good reason to do so now? This is not merely about precedent or status quo – it is looking at precedents, the status quo and considerations about what will work and runs with the grain of familiar norms and practices from the point of view of multicultural inclusion.¹² Inclusion may be

¹² Cf. the discussion on the role of 'operative public values' in Parekh, 2000/2006; and Modood and Thompson, 2017.

possible without using state-religion connexions (SRCs) but they may be one way to achieve it or be part of the way to do it.

My suggestion, then, is that Muslims and other religious minorities are seeking equality through their accommodation within something resembling a multiculturalised version of the status quo in Europe, rather than a disestablishment of Christian churches; they are pursuing an additive view of inclusivity, not a subtractive view. Typically, recognition or accommodation for minorities implies that particular social dimensions important to those minorities become *more*, not less, politically significant. Equality movements do not usually pursue diminished political importance for their social subgroups. This is the case with regard to equality movements about race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, class, and so forth. It is difficult to see why equality concerning religion has to be treated differently. Therefore, the multicultural challenge for secularism is not how to de-Christianise Western states, but how to appropriately include newly-arriving faiths alongside older faiths. Indeed, given that in Western Europe secular philosophies and humanism too have come to be encompassed by concepts of religious freedom and non-discrimination, the contemporary moment can perhaps be best understood as a triangular mutual accommodation between a receding Christian heritage, a growing multi-faithism and a growing secularizing majority (CORAB, 2015; Modood, 2018).

Implications for Religious Education

I hope I have given a clear statement of what I have called moderate secularism, about ways in which it does and does not allow state support for and control of organised religion and religious communities. For example, contrary to many political theorists, I do not see the presence of a state church, such as the 'established' Church of England, as contrary to political secularism, as long as it does not impinge upon political authority, is consistent with liberal democratic constitutionalism, contributes to the advancement of the public good – which in the context of religious diversity includes the promotion of multiculturalism. (As it happens I think the Church of England meets these criteria or is evolving to meet them.) I turn now to consider the implications of my views for religious education.

I think multiculturalist moderate secularism should support a compulsory religious education (RE) in which children of all faiths and none are taught about a variety of faith traditions and their past and current effects upon individuals and societies, upon the shaping of humanity, taught to classes comprising those of all religions and those of none. Such classes should certainly include the contribution of humanism as well as the atheistic critique of religion and can be combined with ethics as is the case in Quebec. In many countries there are advocates for RE as part of a national curriculum.¹³ The main issue in relation to majority precedence

¹³ · Note that all states of the European Union, including France, give funding either to religious schools or for religious education in state schools (Stepan 2011: 117).

is in relation to religious instruction (RI), the induction into a specific faith. Broadly speaking there are two majoritarian possibilities. We have a society where there is a majority religion and that alone is allowed as RI, and minorities might be exempted from those classes but no alternative religious instruction is provided. Or secondly, the majority view is that there should be no RI in state schools, as in the USA or in France (except in state-funded religious schools). Is it fair to impose either of these policies on minorities that do want RI?

That is an appropriate subject for a national dialogue but if after that certain minorities want RI as well as RE, then a truly national system, certainly a multicultural system, must make an effort to accommodate minority RI. In my understanding then, under both the majoritarian possibilities the minorities should have their religions instructed or worshipped within the national system. On the other hand, minorities do not have the right to stop the majority from including the instruction of their religion. We should not, for example, ask schools to cease Christian RI or worship or celebrating Christmas *because* of the presence of Muslims or Hindus; rather, we should extend the celebrations to include, for example, Eid and Diwali. Such separate classes and faith-specific worship needs to be balanced with an approach that brings all the children together and into dialogue; indeed, without that it would be potentially divisive of the school and of society. But where that is in place, voluntary pursuit of one's own faith or philosophical tradition completes the multiculturalist approach to the place of religion in such schools. Learning together about different faiths, including what they have in common and – separately – being instructed in or inducted into one's faith community heritage as a normal school occurrence and not something excluded from the school community are then the two mutually balancing aspects of multiculturalism.

I here draw on three principles based on my discussion of multiculturalism above:

- i) Schools should promote cross-cultural understanding and nurture inclusivity so all can develop a common sense of belonging
- ii) The presence of minority identities should be accommodated on an **additive** not a subtractive basis
- iii) The needs of minorities should not simply be understood in terms of majority preferences: just because the majority does not want something (to display faith through dress or RI classes), it does not mean there should not be institutional provision for it if a minority strongly feels it needs it and it is not harming anyone.

This approach is reflected in the report of the *Commission on Religion and Belief in British Public Life* (CORAB, 2015), of which I was a member. It recommended that religious education – not instruction in a particular religion or secular beliefs – as a multi-disciplinary subject showing the nature and presence of religion and

secular philosophies across time and across the world, as a focus for individuals, communities, law, society and so on should be a compulsory subject at school. It should be taught in classes comprising those of all faiths and none and without exemptions as part of the national curriculum. This knowledge, acquired in diverse classrooms, is essential for living together in mutual understanding and respect.

On the other hand, the existing English law requiring all schools to hold assemblies of a broadly Christian character – largely honoured in the breach in secondary schools – should be repealed. Schools should be free to have no assemblies or religion/belief-specific instruction or several of them or only for those who ask for them – to be achieved through discussions between parents, teachers, pupils and governors – and could take place within the formal timetable or as extra-curricular activities. An option could be all-inclusive assemblies but no single template should be imposed.

Whilst the first recommendation emphasises the need for a common level of understanding arrived at together, the second recognises the importance of allowing and supporting a diversity achieved through dialogue and practiced on a voluntary basis.

This same balance is to be found in CORAB's approach to state-funded faith schools. They constitute about a third of all state schools in England, Anglican being most common at primary and Catholic at secondary levels. They are popular with some parents and their numbers have been growing – an unprecedented half of all Jews are taught in state-funded Jewish schools (Graham, Staetsky and Boyd, 2014: 22). They are an important part of the diversity of the educational system but nevertheless they also contribute to the segregating processes in society. Whilst most educational segregation by religion and ethnicity, not to mention class, is primarily due to the neighbourhoods which feed into local state schools, and parental choice; nevertheless faith schools should not ignore the goal of inclusivity and cohesion. Whilst we did not recommend any kind of quota we urge all faith schools to seek to offer places not confined to those selected on the basis of faith. All bodies responsible for school admissions should be required to take measures to reduce selection on grounds of religion.

State Support for Religion in Flanders, with Special Reference to Schools and Religious Education

Belgium is a good example of my concept of moderate secularism. According to Leni Franken and Patrick Loobuyck, in Belgium today seven worldviews are recognized (Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Anglicanism, Orthodox Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and noncon-fessional humanism), and due to their recognition, they get a lot of privileges: the government pays the salaries and retirements [pensions] of the clergy and of chaplains and nonconfessional moral consultants in hospitals

and in the army; religious courses in public and nonpublic schools are financed by the government; recognized worldviews get free broadcasting time on radio and television; and material goods and housing for the clergy are subsidized by the state.... freedom and support for schools based on particular confessional, nonconfessional, or pedagogical views' (Franken and Loobuyck 2012: 484-485).

Drawing on lines of argument originating with John Rawls (1971), the American political theorist, Franken and Loobuyck elaborate (without necessarily endorsing) the idea that the appropriate liberal egalitarian response to religious and ethical diversity is state neutrality in relation to what Rawls called 'conceptions of the good' and apply it to Belgium (Franken and Loobuyck 2012). They argue that 'under certain conditions, active state support can be defined as a kind of positive, active, benevolent, or favorable neutrality that is still within the scope of liberal neutrality'(481). The critical thing in their view is that there should be 'neutrality of justification', that the state support (or its absence) should not be based on endorsing a religion (such as Christianity) or can only be justified by reference to a religion(s), a philosophy or a worldview.

Readers of the previous sections will note that this is quite different from my approach. I think promoting the national language(s), multiculturalism, ethnic harmony, sense of civic belonging, shorter working week, blue-skies science, music, alleviating poverty or a laissez-faire attitude to all these things (even at the level of justifications) and so on are all informed by one or more conceptions of the good. What I do accept is that the justifications for any of these things must reach the conclusion 'so on balance this furthers the public good or is good for society' and cannot merely be, say, 'because God says so'. I think therefore the term 'neutral state' is quite misleading as I am in favour of 'the committed state', specifically, 'the multiculturalist state', which must actively promote the good.

Franken and Loobuyck's vocabulary is grounded in contemporary Anglophone political theory but runs counter to ordinary English use of 'neutrality'. This is not just a quibble about words. I interpret the Rawlsian starting point in a more minimalist way, namely as a requirement for liberal democratic constitutionalism (Bader, 2007); on top of that, rather than derived from that, I argue for a historically evolved moderate secularism and multiculturalism. A major consequential difference with Franken and Loobuyck and all neutralists is that a religious state – a minimal mono- or plural- or quasi-establishment(s) – is not ruled out of court. They on the other hand argue 'that a political system that is based on one state church or an established church is not in accordance with (egalitarian) liberalism' (484).

Turning to the Belgian case, they identify a number of particular problems in relation to neutrality (equality and liberty), not all of which I can pursue here. It is argued that: to get privileges as a recognized worldview, the worldview has

to be institutionally structured and there has to be one central representative for the government. This criterion is based on the internal structure and the hierarchical organization of the Roman Catholic Church, for which the bishops are the traditional representatives.... The Muslim community for example, was obliged by government to create a representative structure (the Belgian Muslim Executive), and in order to do this, the government organized elections in 1993, 1998, and 2005. Even though some Muslim leaders opposed this idea of elections and participation was weak, state intervention did not stop there: the government did not only oblige diverse Muslim communities to organize themselves within a central organ, but it also screened the elected candidates and decided that some of them were inconvenient. With this policy, the government damages the neutrality and equality principle because it favors a specific (i.e., Roman Catholic) organizational structure. Moreover, with the organization of elections and the screening of candidates, the state did not give enough respect to the (weak) separation of church and state (p. 488-89).

Here, I entirely agree. I have argued elsewhere that multiculturalist accommodation must be open to an institutional 'variable geometry' (Modood and Kastrano 2006).¹⁴

However, I am not persuaded by a recommendation Franken and Loobuyck go on to make. Noting that the Roman Catholic Church receives in excess of 80% of funds disbursed in relation to the above-mentioned forms of state support they discuss how this proportion needs to be revised in the light of the fact that 'the amount of Catholic believers has decreased enormously (490-491).¹⁵ The amount of Flemings that consider themselves religious was as high as 78 percent in 1984 (Dobbelaere, 1984: 74), and decreased to 53 percent in 2002, and 42,4% in 2016. Between 1981 and 2016, the number of Catholic weekly churchgoers decreased from 38 percent to about 6 percent. In the total Flemish adult population (excluding Muslims), the number of Flemings that still regularly or on Christian holy days take part in religious public services is estimated at 22 percent. The remaining 20 percent of Catholics are nominal Catholics who participate only occasionally in collective acts of worship (ESS Round 1, 2002; ESS Round 8, 2016).¹⁶ This can be seen in Table 1, which brings together the figures from the European Social Survey Round 1 (2002) and Round 8 (2016) for Catholics and other religious denominations and so provides a good snapshot of the multi-faith landscape of Flanders (though the figure for Muslims is probably under-estimated).

¹⁴ Though failed to persuade my co-author of its merits, who in the spirit of French republicanism insisted on registering her commitment to an 'institutional assimilationism' in a dissenting footnote: Modood and Kastrano, 2006.

¹⁵ Though Franken and Loobuyck understate the level of belonging to the Catholic Church, as pointed out to me by Jaak Billiet.

¹⁶ Numbers of ESS rounds computed by Jaak Billiet.

Table 1: Proportions of people in Flanders who say they belong to a religious denomination in 2002 and 2016.¹⁷

Religion/denomination	2016 Flanders population %	2002 Flanders population %
Roman Catholic	35,8	48,7
Protestant	0,6	0,5
Eastern Orthodox	0,3	-
Jewish	0,4	1,1
Islamic	4,1	1,6
Eastern religions	0,7	0,3
Other none Christian	0,6	0,8
None (Not belonging)	57,7	46,8
	100,0	100,0

Source: European Social Survey (ESS), Round 1 and Round 8.

In fact in the light of these figures some kind of revision of the proportion spent on Catholic schools probably is due but my reservation is about how it should be calculated. Franken and Loobuyck consider a number of ways of citizens registering a preference for which worldview should be funded but all of them are based on some kind of a head-count (eg., at 'elections or when they fill in their tax form' in which everybody may choose one or no worldview). I think this is too individualistic. Some demographic empirical reference may be necessary; here I would prefer the census, so as to keep it separate from politics and because not everyone fills in a tax form (in the UK it is employers not employees that are responsible), and an annual decision is too frequent. Currently Belgium relies on surveys, such as the European Social Survey (ESS) to measure belonging to a religious denomination as there is no religion question in the Census (and perhaps currently is not permitted by law). Excellent as that survey is it is not a substitute for a religion question in the national census of the kind the UK introduced in the 2001 Census. Not only does that offer a much more accurate figure but it links religious demography to other dimensions of demography (eg., age or spatial location) as well to data on social disadvantage such as poor housing, educational qualifications, levels of unemployment and so on. This allows for identification of demographic trends (with some population groups growing at a faster rate than others) – a key purpose of a census, so as to enable better planning of provision of schools, hospitals, local urban regeneration and so on. Moreover, it allows religious groups in general and newly-established minorities in particular to be more properly recognized both in terms of a preferred identity (eg., religion over

¹⁷ I am grateful to Jaak Billiet for supplying me with this data and related materials and for the cautionary that the ESS, even though it is the best survey of religious belonging in Flanders, like all surveys seriously underestimates the number of Muslims. This is a reason for having a religion question in the national census as I argue below.

national origins) and the scale of their social needs. In this respect, it is notable that the single group that most actively pressed for a religion question in the UK census was Muslims (Sherif 2011). The data provided by the UK censuses of 2001 and 2011 has been invaluable in both of these ways, as data and as a form of identity recognition and inclusion (Hussain and Sherif, 2014). I recommend that Flanders/Belgium should consider inclusion of a religion question in the census.

We, however, have also to consider whether funding a particular worldview contributes to the public good, in which case we might want to contribute to more than one, perhaps all seven, worldviews. We should not reduce the public benefit to the benefit of individual followers of a world view or members of a faith community. That would be a bit like asking only parents of schoolchildren to pay for public education (Franken and Loobuyck, indeed do consider the German *Kirchensteuer*, the voluntary church tax, as a plausible solution).

I do however agree with the more general point that Franken and Loobuyck make, namely that whether there should be any state support for any worldview should be a matter of democratic discussion and that the just state is not obliged to make available such funding; and if it funds any it must fund the others too in an even-handed way (494-496). My point is that if organised faiths, religious communities and worldviews are a public good – and they should not be funded if they are not – then all citizens should contribute to sustaining it. I would also add that as a multiculturalist I do worry about majoritarianism. While I agree with Franken 2017c that the Belgian *constitutional* requirement to give state support to religion and to religious schools is not necessary (and does not exist as such in the UK – which famously does not have a 'written constitution'), I am slightly anxious about a western European future in which religious people are a minority and are stripped of public support on the basis of 'I don't need that provision for myself and so will vote against it'. As I have argued in earlier sections, multiculturalism requires allowing minority needs to be supported even when they run counter to majority preferences or needs, as long as they do not harm anybody. I think this is particularly important in relation to the funding of faith schools and the instruction and worship of faith – on a voluntary opt-in basis – in non-faith schools. I noted in an earlier section, that it may be the case that sometimes the number, the location, the character or specifically the pupil selection criteria of state-funded faith schools can be detrimental to social equality or avoidance of ethno-religious segregation. This is indeed an issue in England. Under such circumstances I can see that it may make sense to consider a stipulation that schools in receipt of public funds have to show that they have made an effort to recruit pupils (say 25% of the school roll) who do not profess the faith identity of the school.

In a later piece, Franken directly argues that there is no consensus about the value and importance of religion(s) and/or state support for religion. For that reason, she holds religions should not be seen as basic or public goods (any

longer), but as non–basic goods or valuable options: for some citizens, religion is still important in their (daily) lives, but this is not the case for all citizens (Franken 2017c: 63). She does not rule out state support for religion, rather that '[f]rom an autonomy-based perspective, one can argue that state support for religion is sometimes permitted in order to facilitate religion as one of the many valuable options to choose from or in order to guarantee religious freedom in an active way'(p. 64). 'The state can never support religions, however, because religions are valuable', only because autonomy (or neutrality etc) is (p. 66). It may be unnecessary to point out that while Franken's argument about when state support for religion is justified is based on appeal to autonomy qualified by neutrality, mine is based on appeal to three different sets of considerations:

- Identity, recognition and distinctive ethno-religious needs
- Equality, inclusion, national belonging
- Public/national good

And is qualified by liberal democratic constitutionalism.

Turning to the specific questions of religious education and of state support for faith schools, I note that there is a constitutional requirement upon state schools in Flanders to provide confessional religious education/instruction in any or all of the seven recognised worldviews to students who or whose parents request it. The vast majority of school students, 75% at secondary and 62% at primary in Flanders are enrolled in state-funded schools, 99% of which are Roman Catholic (Franken and Loobuyck 2013). Such students' religious education currently takes the form of a Catholic Dialogue School approach. Lieven Boeve describes the idea of a Catholic Dialogue School based on 'taking differences seriously' and the understanding that 'dialogue with the other is constitutive for the construction of one's identity', it is argued that [i]n such process, in Catholic schools, Christians may become better Christians, because more self-reflexive Christians; in the same way as Muslims may become better Muslims, and atheists better atheists (Boeve 2014?: 11-12).

Is this simultaneous multilogue a realistic aspiration for a Catholic school? Firstly, are Catholic schools, teachers and teacher-training curricula sufficiently reflexive in terms of competence as well as commitment? Secondly, can such a dialogue really take place where one of the parties is totally in charge in terms of control and numbers? Will not at best such schools produce reflective Catholics rather than what the above quote promises? For a true multilogue, each party needs to be sufficiently present in number and influence for not just mono- but multi-reflexivity to be pursued (Gurin et al, 2013). For the latter, are we not talking about multi-worldview schools. They seem to be in short supply in Flanders.

It is interesting, however, that empirical research suggests that more than 60% of students in Catholic schools prefer a 'colourful' or more multicultural school and

about half of adults (school staff, parents and the school leadership) surveyed see that as compatible with the idea of a dialogue school (Pollefeyt and Bouwens 2013: 2). Partly due to pressure coming from resistance shown by many students and some adults against an explicitly Catholic approach, the 'path of least resistance' frequently ends up being chosen. The result is a gradual yet clear evolution in the direction of the Colourful School (p. 3). Drawing on their study of schools in Australia Pollefeyt and Bouwens propose a *kerygmatic* Catholic school in which the purpose is not to proclaim an existing faith but in which all parties are open to transformation by the dia/multilogue.

I commend these Catholic dialogue and colourful approaches to Catholic religious education, which are very important given that the majority of pupils in Flanders are taught in Catholic schools (75% of secondary and 62% of primary), though I have also heard some doubts expressed about to what extent a dialogical approach is being pursued. Nevertheless, I understand this approach as a Catholic mono-confessional approach (what I call RI, religious instruction) and so this is not a substitute for the arguments I gave above for why I think a proper religious education (RE) should be a compulsory school subject in all publically funded schools, namely to improve religious literacy for all, an understanding of the different faiths/worldviews and an understanding of the good and the bad that religion can contribute in the lives of individuals and in society. Such a subject based on a common national curriculum (with some limited scope for discretion at a school level) is important for building a pillar of commonality and an appreciation of diversity (for an overview of this topic but without specific reference to Flanders, see Franken 2017a; for a discussion of Islamic education in Belgium, see Franken 2017b). Conversely, RI, confessional religious instruction – and also collective worship – should not be a compulsory requirement in public schools but should be available for any of the seven recognised religions/worldviews on school premises if a significant number of parents and/or pupils request it. It may be however that such confessional classes and worship may have to be slotted in outside the formal timetable (eg. before or after classes or at lunchtime). Confessional schools should be free to make RI and worship arrangements that they believe reflect the mission of the school but they must allow exemptions when these are requested (but not from non-confessional RE); this is of special concern because in larger cities many Muslims attend Catholic schools, and frequently form a majority, and also the majority of parents and especially (older) students from Catholic background are not believing Catholics (Franken 2017c: 77-78).

The ideal of a compulsory RE as a regular school subject within a national curriculum as described above depends upon the availability of suitable teachers. It is likely that this does not exist at the moment so such a proposal could not be implemented straight away. It should therefore be a matter of priority that teacher training colleges and university departments design suitable courses for existing teachers (including those who need assistance to teach RE after years of having only taught RI) and for a new generation of trainee teachers.

I believe my educational proposals, based on my work with the Commission on the place of Religion and Belief in British Public Life, as briefly described above, chime with those made by Patrick Loobuyck and Leni Franken but I cannot be certain that they do so in all respects as theirs are available only in Dutch and my knowledge of them is based only on private emails from Franken and on Franken (2017c: 72-79). It should be clear however that I take a different position to them in relation to my understanding of legitimate state support for religion and ethno-religious communities and their understanding of what support is legitimate from the point of view of liberal egalitarian state neutrality (a position which they elaborate but do not necessarily endorse (Franken and Loobuyck, 2012: 479, 497).

Finally, in the discussion of Flemish multiculturalism above I noted that state schools allow students to be absent on up to six holy days of all religious denominations recognized by the Belgian Constitution. This is remarkably multiculturalist and Flanders may be the only place in Europe or even the only Christian-heritage place that does this, a practice more common in Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia and Sengal, and also India (Stepan 2011). On the other hand, the ban on 'ostentatious religious dress', such as the Muslim headscarf, Jewish kippa or Sikh turban, in Belgian state schools goes in the opposite direction and aligns Flanders with some of the most anti-multiculturalist practice in Europe.

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Understanding crime and delinquency in a multicultural society

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Executive Summary

Taking the cultural and ethical ambivalence in Belgium about including ethnicity as a variable of diversity in data documentation and reporting as its point of departure, this paper argues that empirical research on delinquency, predominant among second-generation boys and young men of some immigrant groups in Belgium, is rooted in socio-economic disparities and not directly in cultural difference or lack of integration. Empirical research will not only help to counteract the selectivity inherent in the entire criminal justice chain with a multicultural personnel policy, it will also allow a greater understanding of emergent cultures and attitudes among some second-generation immigrant groups.

Ethnic diversity in Belgium

Immigration waves of various sizes since World War II have resulted in dramatic changes in the ethnic composition of Western European populations. According to the official figures provided by the Belgian Directorate-General of Statistics and Information, of the total population of over 11,000,000 in Belgium, 1,200,000 are *aliens*, i.e., they do not have Belgian passports. In addition, almost 1,000,000 of those born elsewhere have been naturalised as Belgian citizens. If we also considered the second and third generations whose parents or grandparents were once citizens of other countries, 27.5% of Belgium's population has foreign roots (Van den Broucke et al. 2016: 98).

Let me start by examining the immigration movements, which can be discerned notwithstanding the surprising diversity of the immigrants and their descendants. The largest group consists of the children and grandchildren of the *guest workers* who were brought in between the 1950s and the 1980s to perform low-skilled jobs. In the 1980s, those who decided to stay on for good brought over their wives and children, transforming their labor migration into permanent immigration. Since the Italian workers were the first to be recruited in Belgium, as far as in the 1920s, with generations that came thereafter, they may now constitute the largest group (the exact figure is unknown) to have descended from the earliest migratory labourers. They are followed by those with Moroccan (over 400,000) and Turkish (250,000) backgrounds. Secondly, there are approximately 60,000 Belgian residents with roots in the Congo, Burundi and Ruanda. Compared with other ex-colonial nations in Europe, this figure is extremely low. As the people in the colonies were never granted Belgian citizenship, immigration from there remained limited to an elite group of students, diplomats and businessmen.

Starting in 1990, Belgium opened its borders to a broader range of Congolese, among them also immigrants of a lower socio-economic standing. The third group is from countries bordering Belgium, almost 300,000 from France and over 200,000 from the Netherlands. The fourth heterogeneous category of immigrants, complex and still hard to specify, consists of people who came to Belgium in the past twenty or thirty years for a wide range of reasons. They include diplomats and political refugees, for example, from Afghanistan, job seekers from countries like Poland, foreign students and economic migrants from countries like Albania.

These waves of immigration have given rise to a multicultural society in Belgium that has been associated with ethnic richness and variety, but – rightly or not – also with a range of challenges and social problems that are addressed in this report. How can society deal with it? Various modes of integration are conceivable, one of which is described in Tariq Modood's political theory of multiculturalism, which constitutes the other half of this report. Here the specific focus is on two social problems, usually associated with immigration and the emergence of a multicultural society. The first relates to crime and delinquency, and second to issues of radicalisation and terrorism. These issues do not concern the majority of immigrants. Within these groups, such risks increasingly affect only the socio-economically disadvantaged. The field of criminology uses its theoretical framework to provide an extensive and varied agenda for preventing and combating crime. The report closes with my own comments on aspects of the crime problem caused in part by the present-day criminal-justice approach, with the police practice of ethnic profiling, with inequality in sentencing, and a dearth of trust between the minority communities and the law enforcement system. I base my argument using the moral theory of affirmative action. This provides a policy program that focuses on access to education and employment, in an attempt to redress the disadvantages and disparities experienced by minorities. The main impetus is to ensure that public institutions become more representative of the populations they serve (Feinberg, 2009).

This report is based on the criminological literature on migration, ethnicity and crime in Belgium, especially in Flanders. I was helped by colleagues at the Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts during its informative sessions as well as through personal interviews with individuals and agencies and comments on an earlier version of this report. Being an anthropologist by training, my report about contemporary social problems could not have been drafted without directly talking to the people most involved and without at least some first-hand observation of the situation. I interviewed practitioners in the administration, the police (who were reluctant to share information) and the judiciary. I was shown around in two neighbourhoods, Molenbeek and Mechelen, which are mentioned in the discussion about Muslim radicalisation as representing opposite poles.

A social profile of immigrant groups

The present demographics of Belgium can only be explained in relation to the waves of immigration (Geldof 2017, Leman 2017a). To fully understand it, I first go back to the immigration story and to the social and political capital immigrants brought with them. I then use a conventional integration framework to characterise the socio-economic and cultural profile of immigrants and especially their second generation.

The large-scale immigration of two groups that are usually associated with crime and delinquency that I am interested in for the purpose of this report, namely, of Turks and Moroccans, date back fifty years. In traditional migration sociology, a half-century period is needed to complete the integration process from the first to the third generation (cf. Duncan 1933 for the U.S., and Price 1966 for Australia). The assumption more or less holds true for such immigrant groups as the Italians in Belgium, but not for all the groups. For some, immigration is an ongoing process carried out via family reunification or via marriage. Belgians with Moroccan roots are known to seek their brides in the Rif Mountains with the idea of raising their Belgian-born children speaking Amazigh (Dupont et al. 2017).

The enormous expansion of international transportation services is greatly facilitating new immigration and transnational ties. On one level, they pose obstacles to integration, e.g., resulting in the political interference of the home country that seeks to undermine the civil loyalty of Belgian citizens to the new country (cf. suffrage for Turks or imams sent abroad by the King of Morocco). The research community and the political arena are realising that integration will remain an ongoing issue for a long time to come.

Until now, the political and social debates on multiculturalism in Belgium have mainly focused on the largest immigrant groups, predominantly those with roots in Morocco and Turkey, whose cultural distance to the 'host population' is the greatest. There have been obstacles to their integration and a drastic change in how these groups are perceived in Belgium and in other Western European countries. Islam is now the second-largest religion in Belgium and Muslims now constitute 6% of the population.¹ Once *guest workers* in the factories, now they are seen as *Muslims*, so that young people face an identity crisis: *Am I Belgian or Moroccan? Or Muslim?* (Benyaich 2013).

The immigration of these groups initially only involved male guest workers from poor and underdeveloped parts of their countries. An estimated 70-80 per cent

¹ Throughout Europe, research shows that the majority population greatly overestimates the number of Muslims. In Belgium, the percentage of Muslims is estimated at approximately 25% of the total population!

of the Moroccans are from the Rif Mountains in the north and most of the Turks are from Central Anatolia. After the employers' first recruitment campaigns made it clear that labourers were needed in Western Europe, most prospective guest workers came of their own accord. Via a system of chain migration, individuals transplanted entire communities to Belgium and, as already mentioned, this is an ongoing process. Timmerman and Wets (2011) speak of a still thriving culture of migration in districts of Anatolia focused on Belgium. This process is often analysed in Belgian migration literature as the transplantation of the old community to a new country (Lesthaeghe, 1996:52).

The settlement pattern has tended to mirror the labour market trends at the moment of immigration. In the 1960s, most newcomers were employed in construction, the industrial sector or services. The private housing market served as a selection mechanism (Kasteloot 2005). The concentration of immigrants in a few districts of Brussels and Antwerp is striking. Bousetta (2010) estimates that two-thirds of the immigrants from Morocco and their children inhabit no more than ten of the 589 municipalities in Belgium. The main arrival districts in the large cities are Stuyvenberg in Antwerp and the southern part of Molenbeek in Brussels. As more successful immigrants move on to better neighbourhoods, for those who stay behind, this results in a process of social disintegration.

This concentration has a considerably deleterious effect on opportunities for intercultural contact. According to the Flemish Migration and Integration Monitor in 2015 (Van den Broucke et al. 2016: 8, 9), despite the enormous diversity of the population as a whole, half the Belgo-Belgian population lives in almost exclusively native Belgian neighbourhoods, especially in the barely urbanised areas. A survey on the attitudes of the host population to the newcomers illustrates the contact hypothesis in sociology. Four out of ten respondents view immigrants as 'a threat to our culture and customs', but there is more tolerance among younger people and residents of mixed neighbourhoods (Van den Broecke et al. 2016: 9).

Structural and cultural integration

In the theory on immigration and integration, a distinction is generally drawn between structural and cultural integration (Junger-Tas et al. 2001; Entzinger & Biezeveld 2003). Structural integration, as experienced by the minority groups or individuals, is usually measured by benchmarking their position in the school system, on the labour market and with regard to income and housing. Socio-cultural integration refers to participation in society's institutions, to interpersonal contacts outside one's own group, and to the extent to which behaviour patterns of the receiving country are adopted. Cultural integration is measured by the degree to which value orientation and identification of immigrants has shifted to the host country. This last aspect also has to do with the acceptance of fundamental Western values, such as individual autonomy, respect for human rights and gender equality.

The problem in Belgium is that it is not easy to draw up a statistically accurate profile for the various immigrant communities because the National Register in Belgium (Het Rijksregister) does not provide data on migration background. While some information about the structural integration of the first-generation immigrants in Belgium is available, more cannot be found about the second generation (see however: Neels & Stoop 2000; Centrum voor gelijkheid van kansen en voor racismebestrijding 2013; Fleischmann et al. (2013)

Throughout Western Europe, the mass dismissals due to the stagnation of the economy were a shattering blow to those who had come in as guest workers in the early 1970s. In retrospect, it is notable that the industrial jobs largely disappeared, particularly at the lowest levels. Many men could not find a different job and became dependent on welfare provisions. In the 1980s, this drama was unfolding at precisely the same time as family reunification in Belgium and other countries in Western Europe (Ouali 2004; Daoud 2011). It could not have occurred at a less fortuitous moment. As a result, many children grew up in families with an unemployed father and had to depend on social welfare benefits for their income.

According to the data from the Flemish Integration Monitor, the second generation is faring better than the first from an economic perspective, but it still considerably lags behind the rest of the population. Unemployment rates are high and this also holds true for the second generation. An estimated 18% of the young people with roots in the Maghreb and 17% of those with Turkish roots are out of work, as compared to only 4% of the Belgo-Belgian population. The figures on poverty paint a particularly gloomy picture for some immigrant groups. Part of the explanation is the low number of working women among the most disadvantaged groups. A health survey shows the following percentages of the population living below the EU poverty line (Van Robaeys et al. 2007)

Table 1. — Living below the European Union Poverty Line in Percentages by Ethnic Background (2001) 12.66 %

Belgian	10.16 %
Turkish	58.94 %
Moroccan	55.50 %
Italian	21.49 %
Total population	12.66 %

According to figures drawn up by Djait (2015), with the exception of Asians, the welfare dependence of the population with roots outside the European Union is high. One possible way to facilitate economic independence is to help them to open a shop, restaurant or a small business. The rules and regulations are not that strict in Belgium, but studies on super-diverse entrepreneurship in Antwerp (Lens

et al. 2015) do not show clear success for the immigrant groups as a whole. The second generation is more successful than the first, but continues to concentrate on traditional sectors that cater to their own ethnic group.

As regards the performance of the second generation at school levels, the youngest generation is also doing comparatively better but is still lagging behind non-immigrant Belgian pupils. Van der Bracht et al. (2014) note that ethnic minorities in Belgium are not doing as badly at school as in other European countries. However, the school selection system is such that it replicates the socio-economic inequalities.

In order to find relevant data on cultural integration, it is necessary to take into account the research conducted by Ron Lesthaeghe and his staff two decades ago on Turkish and Moroccan communities in Belgium (Lesthaeghe 2000). The difference between the two communities was striking. Based on the data collected then, the close-knit Turkish community was well organised and focused on the home country, both politically and as regards its values. There was strict social control to keep youngsters in line. The Moroccan communities, on the contrary, were shown to be strongly divided and individualistic, and it was hard for parents to discipline their children. Since this is so similar to what I know about cultural integration in the Netherlands, I can safely assume that second-generation Moroccan immigrants are more rapidly adopting the Belgian culture than the Turkish youths. This is confirmed by Kanmaz (2009), who analyses the development of the Islamic religious infrastructure in Belgium.

Integration normally means becoming a part of the middle class. But immigrants can also become a part of the lower class. American migration sociologists often use the history of the fifty years of guest workers in Europe as an example of this unfavourable variant (Alba 2005). In what they call *segmented integration*, a poverty-stricken underclass emerges alongside a successful second generation. According to Timmerman et al. (2003), this trend could be observed in Belgium with the majority of the Moroccan or Turkish second generation and could largely be attributed to the systemic selection and admissions policy in the Belgian school system.

First, on the success of the integration process: There is a certain enthusiasm among present-day researchers in Belgium about the prevalence of *super-diversity* in some urban neighbourhoods (Geldof 2016). Various integration processes can be observed among people of various backgrounds who live side-by-side, whereby not just ethnicity but also variables, such as gender, age, duration of stay in Belgium and elements of human capital, play a role. Interpersonal relations are characterised by a hospitable form of conviviality. Oud-Berchem, the neighbourhood that was studied in Antwerp, has improved considerably in the course of the gentrification process. Shops, restaurants and small businesses owned and run by local residents are flourishing, and this is also where the

successful second generation of Turkish and Moroccan immigrants live. There is no reason to devote special attention to crime here (Blommaert 2014).

More attention needs to be paid to crime in the less successful segment of the second generation that lives in relative poverty and is concentrated in Borgerhout in Antwerp and Molenbeek in Brussels (Sauviller 2017). Judging by the news items and the general public perception, these are crime-ridden areas. However, since no ethnicity-specific statistics are available and no systematic research has been conducted to date on social disadvantage in the problematic neighbourhoods, the criminological literature can neither confirm nor deny the accuracy of this perception.

Discrimination

The social disadvantage is reinforced by the discrimination these groups face when looking for a job or housing. Academic research on discrimination and exclusion was launched later in Belgium than elsewhere in Europe, but the situation has now changed for the better. The latest research results from Ghent show how applicants are already discriminated against on the basis of their 'foreign' last name (Baert, 2017). How is discrimination being studied now? Unia, the Inter-Federal Equal Opportunity Centre in Belgium, is tasked with the investigation of inequality based on ethnic background in the fields of employment, housing and education. By comparing data collected by the social security services with information from the population administration or National Registry (Rijksregister), it is possible to periodically draw up surveys in what they call *diversity barometers* on the social position of minorities in employment and housing. The resulting figures might initially indicate discrimination, but hard evidence on that is not available. Barely any interviews have been conducted thus far with the parties concerned and with the potential victims and perpetrators, though Unia has done studies with the help of focus groups of tenants and landlords, which produce less convincing evidence than the method of testing actual practice.

How do employers and landlords really deal with ethnic minority applicants, for instance, when interviews are called for? Ever since the first test was conducted for the ILO on the Belgian labour market in 1998, the evidence of discrimination in Belgium can no longer be denied (Arriijn, Feld and Nayer 1998). Various surveys on the housing market, one of which was conducted in Ghent, have shown that discrimination persists there as well. Van der Bracht, Verhaeghe and Van der Putten (2015) note that 37% of ethnic minority applicants looking for an apartment are not even invited to view the property.

This research method of what has been called situation tests or natural experiments is currently being debated (Verhaeghe and Van der Bracht 2017). Employer organisations are in favour of solving the problem via self-regulation. Belgium is

beginning to be aware that in the United States and the United Kingdom (here the method is called *auditing*), evidence of this sort can be presented in court in demonstration of unequal treatment.

That discrimination intensifies inequality and the social isolation of minority groups, and it can exacerbate delinquency as well, is clear. At the end of this report, I will address the possible effects of discrimination by the police and the criminal justice system.

Ethnic diversity, delinquency and terrorism

From a demographic perspective, registered crime is a rather specific phenomenon (Beirne and Messerschmidt 2014). Crimes are disproportionately committed by boys and young men (13-23 years) from the lower socio-economic strata. It is often remarked that delinquency is particularly widespread in certain ethnic groups. This fourth factor is hard to prove if the ethnic group in question is over-represented in the lowest socio-economic classes. What do relatively high crime rates indicate? – A low socio-economic status, an ethnic or cultural background, or a combination of both? Ample criminological research undertaken in Western Europe shows that, even within the same socio-economic class, crime rates and profiles differ by ethnicity. Given the usefulness of ethnicity as a variable in research, it is now often included in statistical research (Bucarius and Tonry 2014). In addition, individuals from different ethnic backgrounds are also known to conduct themselves differently in the courtroom than the expected norms (thus evincing different cultural attitudes). Research has shown that this is based on cultural difference and that there is every reason to assume that the patterns of the crimes committed and the justice subsequently administered differ in a multicultural society along ethnic lines (Bovenkerk 1993).

In Belgium, the available data in the crime statistics do not include information on ethnic descent. This is primarily due to the fear of violating personal privacy. It holds true not only for issues relating to ethnic descent and delinquency but also for other social problems. In the list compiled by the independent London institute Privacy International, Belgium always comes up as a country where demographic data is most protected. The reluctance to link ethnic descent and delinquency is understandable, since the majority society is politically opposed to such a practice.

High crime rates and terrorist attacks are unjustly cited throughout Europe as the evidence of a failing multicultural society. At the same time, they are part and parcel of our daily reality and deserve to be further examined, if the debate is to be conducted in a serious fashion. Some critics feel that creating an ethnic focus on research relating to problems of this kind sends the wrong message. Summarising everything that is going wrong and emphasising the need for integration can easily put the blame on a specific disadvantaged group. Registering where immigrants

come from also goes against the grain of the integration policy in Belgium, where the idea is for immigrants to become Belgians as quickly as possible, so that the second and third generations cease to be referred to as immigrants.²

For reasons relating to the challenges of conducting research on crime and terrorism, I cannot agree with the Belgian reluctance to include information on ethnicity. The main goal of such research is to promote inclusive citizenship and to prevent a system of ethnic inequality. Unfortunately, this is not feasible without adequately meeting the problems at hand. After identifying the problems, I shall describe the type of solutions that have been successfully implemented in countries where the scientific findings were faced head on.

Pros and cons of research into ethnicity and delinquency

What do we know about the ethnicity of juvenile delinquency and the causes of modern terrorism? What are the problems facing people affected by them and those in charge of formulating and implementing policy in this field? What direction should they be looking in for solutions?

To provide some initial answers, we need statistical and other factual information about ethnic backgrounds. In the first and so far only effort to present an overview of research into immigration and crime in Belgium, Hebberecht (1997) was surprised to note there were barely any figures available, as it was Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874), a Belgian, who was among the first to see the usefulness of statistics in social science and criminography. Hebberecht spared no effort in gathering material from municipal authorities and police forces, but only managed to secure one internal Antwerp police report. He did cite prison figures, but discovered that they only documented the home country of foreigners and failed to include the ethnicity of the second-generation immigrants with Belgian citizenship.

I was struck by this gap in my pursuit of recent research results. In fact, as soon as the issue comes up, Belgian criminologists spontaneously reminisce about a related controversy in 2000. Even before the research plan was first drawn up, an assignment given by Minister of Justice Marc Verwilghen to criminologist Marion van San to gather data about crime rates among youngsters of various ethnic minorities led to protests from fellow criminologists (Brion 2001). The minister's subsequent refusal to present the research results to the public led to even more objections. The report was nonetheless published in 2001 (Van San and Leerkes 2001). The quantitative data were based on material they had themselves gathered and do not include figures to which the opponents could object.

² Brion (2004) considers the study of crime and ethnicity 'a typical Dutch peculiarity'. She is right in so far as ethnicity is taken into account in many research projects in Holland without much theoretical reflexion.

The ultimate result of this unfortunate start of a potentially productive and relevant research theme in the history of criminology is a carefully considered list of *objections* to the theme.³ (1) Theoretical: The choice of the subject based solely on essentialist reasoning could suggest that culture or ethnicity directly incited crime. In addition, it is erroneous to ascribe relatively high crime rates in certain disadvantaged neighbourhoods to minorities that live there. (2) Empirical: The research is redundant since earlier studies already demonstrate that variations in the crime rates of specific ethnic minorities can be explained by a combination of socio-economic factors and selectivity in the policies and processes followed by the police and criminal justice apparatus. This is the dominant paradigm in Belgian criminology. (3) Social and political: Research of this kind can easily encourage stigmatisation of certain groups and contribute to their marginalisation. People also felt that the minister's research assignment had been overly publicised as result of the sensationalization of the ethnic minority riots in 1991 in Brussels and Antwerp.

There are also arguments in favour of the theme. (1) The main theoretical objection is that researchers wilfully overlook questions relevant to formulating a theory of cultural diversity. By rejecting the studies in advance, the Belgian research community loses touch with a topical theme in criminology. Theories on the multicultural society cannot be developed without empirical research. To be sure, significant studies on crime and delinquency in this field are conducted in Belgium, but often they focus on social constructions of social problems⁴ or on statistical correlations of crime figures in administrative units⁵ and not on (the circumstances of) the crime itself. (2) The empirical sciences can only move forward by constantly testing questions presented by the research of others. There is ample knowledge in this regard in other countries. No researcher can seriously claim to have the final answer. One important aspect that is generally overlooked is the well-known fact in criminology that the victims of crimes are disproportionately from the same ethnic group as the perpetrators. Ignoring that is not an expression of compassion with the victims. (3) It would seem as if the academic world in Belgium has long faced a taboo. Readers will be struck by how passionately the debate has been conducted (Smet 2006), but taboos do not belong in the world of science. The question remains as to whether the wariness the topic has tended to produce in Belgium really leads to the desired result. Deliberately ignoring an existing problem raises the risk of it being misunderstood as a general migrant phenomenon and becoming politically unmanageable. (4) The main social argument against avoiding research on ethnicity and crime is that exaggerated (right-wing) assertions targeting ethnic and religious minorities can

³ I summarized the pros and cons in a first publication years ago (Bovenkerk, 2007). This is a more extensive overview of the problem tailored to a Belgian (Flemish) audience.

⁴ see for example Pentintseva 2016.

⁵ see for example Hooghe et al. 2011.

best be refuted with scientific facts based on empirical research. What is more, a lack of research makes it less politically urgent to take measures to remedy undesirable situations.

Where do we stand as of 2017 with respect to research practice in criminology? Research conducted in Belgium is focused on the socio-economic background of juvenile delinquency and selectivity in the behaviour of the police and the courts. There are good studies on the social construction of crime within certain ethnic groups, but basic data on the criminality itself are scarce. As a consequence of that, time and again researchers have to compile their own research population, their own random sample or research group. There are research studies with interviews with a small sample of usually young people with an immigration background. It is relatively easy for self-reported delinquency studies conducted at schools to reach more respondents. I recently examined all the Belgian studies that mentioned crime among Moroccans to see how high the crime rates were among boys/young men (13-25 years) with a Moroccan background (Bovenkerk 2014: 233-240). Studies that compare the global crime rates of Belgians of foreign descent with those of Belgo-Belgians already exist. I found statistics on Moroccans in general, but they are not categorised according to gender or age. It seems as if social problems have been made invisible by grouping them into broad statistical categories. The debate in Belgium is especially about young men with a migration background in Morocco, essentially about a group on which we have no specific statistics. Belgium is thus left out of the international discussion in criminology on immigration and crime.⁶

A change is, however, foreseeable. Researchers at the Youth Research Platform, where Stefan Pleysier is one of the supervisors, write about the delinquency rates among schoolchildren. This group even dared to take up as a sensitive subject as feelings of guilt and shame after delinquency by Muslims (De Boeck et al., 2017). They are more apt to blame the unfamiliarity with crime-related data in Belgium on 'general criminographic poverty' than on a denial of the problems (Cops et al. 2014, 2015). This might well be the case, but to this day, it is still impossible to precisely state the level of registered crime in a group of a specific ethnic descent.

Immigration and crime

Based on the international literature, what crime patterns can be identified or expected in the ethnic minorities in Belgium? Certain aspects continue to recur. Firstly, criminal conduct among the immigrants of the first generation is as high as that in the majority society or even less. There are four reasons why: (1) The first-generation immigrants, who came from the countryside and were raised in

⁶ Belgium is not even once mentioned in the extensive *Oxford Handbook of Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration* edited by Bucerius & Tonry.

a society with a great deal of social control, obeyed the rules. (2) Their legal position was still so uncertain that they did not want to risk getting into trouble with the police. (3) The men of the first generation were migratory workers with jobs and income (4) A successful criminal career requires knowledge of the new country that they did not have as yet. Bui and Thongniramol (2005) remind us that these aspects were first observed in the United States in 1901, and again in 1931 by the Wickersham Commission. Importantly, Robert J. Sampson (2008) demonstrates that urban neighbourhoods in the United States are now safer with immigration than without it, and Lee and Martinez (2009) sum up the results of more than a decade of research into this matter in the United States in their article, *Immigration Reduces Crime*. In 1968, Ferracuti of the Council of Europe was the first to observe in post-war Europe that the first generation is less criminal than immigration opponents tend to assume. After inspecting crime figures all across Western Europe, Solivetti arrived at the same conclusion in 2010.

Second-generation crime

While there is general consensus in literature that the second generation runs a greater risk of getting into trouble with the police and courts, I argue that this only holds true for certain ethnic groups. When immigrants do well and are relatively law-abiding, this is usually attributed to the social and cultural capital they brought with them. If the second generation exhibits criminal tendencies, they are concentrated in the young men of the lower socio-economic classes. In Belgian criminology, this is linked to a model of *social vulnerability* (Vettenburg and Walgrave 2008). This theory holds that higher crime rates are also caused by decision-making selectivity in schools, on the labour and the housing markets as well as within the criminal justice chain.

But not all disadvantaged ethnic groups exhibit higher than average registered crime rates. Though they do not differ much in their structural integration and socio-economic profile, in the Netherlands, the second-generation Turkish migrants exhibit far less delinquency than the Moroccans. Cops et al. (2014) draw the same conclusion from a survey of 2,500 pupils between the ages of 14-16 at Flemish schools in Brussels. This difference can be explained by examining the second form of integration, the socio-cultural component. One might expect more rapid integration to produce less delinquency, but the opposite is the case. Relatively rapidly integrating groups that lag behind socio-economically are most exposed to frustration, which can explain delinquency as a covert form of protest. In the words of the British criminologist Jock Young (2007: 140): 'It is the second generation of immigrants who have become assimilated to the values of the wider society who must feel relative deprivation, the discontent of which frequently leads to higher crime rates'.

The problem of causality

It is a common notion that high crime rates are caused by poverty, unemployment and discrimination, which pose obstacles to success. However, the causality can also work the other way around. Youngsters who are juvenile delinquents even before they leave school or apply for a job can ruin their own chances in advance. To youngsters surrounded by the temptations of a life of crime, juvenile delinquency may become the norm. In certain milieus, getting arrested does not mean losing face. On the contrary, criminals become role models, and no one is really that afraid of the penalties any more. So it is not just deprivation that leads to crime, it is also crime that may lead to deprivation.

A similar line of reasoning can be applied to entire urban districts. Especially if one ethnic group in a poor socio-economic position dominates an entire neighbourhood for a long period of time, the second and third generations can develop a subculture that stimulates crime. Neighbourhood residents rebel against the outside world and view the neighbourhood as their territory. They distrust official institutions like local state agencies and the police. In the course of time, an alternative opportunity structure can emerge in the world of crime. It has been documented in the Netherlands that young Moroccans and Turks are active in neighbourhoods like this in the lower ranks of the drug trade and in other forms of organised crime (Tops and Van der Torre 2014). This undermines the legal economy and the moral standards.

The criminal lifestyle has allowed its own form of integration. If this is the case, the police are not helped by studies on the 'official' culture of the country from which the first generation immigrants hail. The police will have to bring officers in close contact with the second generation in the receiving country through a system of community policing. They will have to get acquainted with the street culture and reflect on the modes and effects of their interventions.

Culture as an explanation of second-generation delinquency

It is tempting to attribute marked differences in the crime rates between groups to the cultural factor, making it seem as if cultural differences and inadequate levels of structural integration of the group underlie the high crime rates. This explanation has given rise to so much resistance one might wonder whether a monolithic concept like culture is of any use in this connection. Such paradigms might be useful where cultural crimes (honour killings, female circumcision) are concerned, but in general the crime pattern of young second-generation men can barely be distinguished from that of their peers, if at all. Here, I would first like to cite the objection that the concept of culture can be used in an essentialist way. In early anthropology, culture was often presented as concentrated in a specific core or essence, such as honour, shame or collectivism. Material facts as well as

norms and values were perceived as manifestations of this essence. From this perspective, cultures constitute static wholes and any mixture of various cultures is taken to be an anomaly. The *culturalisation* or *orientalisation* of concrete crimes can lead to premature conclusions. Homophobic acts of violence, for example, are easily ascribed to North African perpetrators without needing any further evidence.

In cases of concrete crimes, it is often extremely difficult to identify the underlying causal process. In criminology, we prefer to consider general risk factors that are theoretically backed and have been empirically tested. These factors can include social control, an authoritarian style of parenting or cutting classes at school. The anthropological concept of culture can coexist with this criminological theory, insofar as general risk factors of this kind are unequally divided over various ethnic groups. I have repeatedly come across comments in Flemish criminography about the high frequency with which groups of second-generation Moroccan boys are on the street late at night without supervision (see e.g., Casman et al. 1992, Duchateau 2004). This obviously has to do with the freedom Moroccan parents often give their sons. The general mechanism of absent parental control thus leads to a greater risk of crime among second-generation Moroccans. Walgrave (2006) arrives at a similar conclusion in the draft of his guidelines for investigating Moroccan juvenile delinquency. He is reluctant to assume a simplistic link between the Moroccan culture and delinquency. Boys are easy to recognise on the street, they tend to hang out in public places and to respond to police attention with provocations, and so forth. Unfortunately, he never carried out his research plan.

A younger generation of researchers calls this pattern of youth socialisation in the public sphere *street culture* (De Jong 2007). It is clear that second-generation youngsters act very differently than their parents in several ways. They underwent early education in the new country and now speak its language. They also meet and interact with youngsters of different ethnic backgrounds on the street. They no longer reproduce the culture of their parents, as they are socialised via their peers and actively craft their own culture piece-by-piece. This is most clearly illustrated in the street language they use, the way they dress, and their typical *tough-guy* gestures. Criminologists who observe these groups in Europe (for the Netherlands, see Driessen et al. 2014) tend to refer to American studies on networks and youth gangs in urban disadvantaged neighbourhoods and less to their immigration background.

The current trend is to use the *cultural dissonance theory*, to make deviant behaviour easier to comprehend. Youngsters with foreign roots need to find their place between the culture of their parents and the ways of the majority population. The difficulties this entails are especially evident in groups where the traditional normative control system no longer functions effectively. The more individualistic the group's mind-set is, the greater the chance of social disorganisation. On the one hand, this can lead to successful careers outside the ethnic concentration

area. On the other, it can also lead to criminal activities or psychological disorders. At the individual level, Berry (1997) distinguishes four logical ways to cope with *acculturation stress*. Once the new society has been internalised in all its aspects, we can speak of *assimilation*. *Separation* is the exact opposite. Youngsters opt to lead their lives completely inside their own culture. *Integration* means youngsters function well in the home culture of their parents as well as the new culture of the majority population. *Marginalisation* is observed when youngsters reject both the culture of their parents and the host culture. In this last case, there is a clear risk of slipping into a life of crime. Berry considers the acculturation strategy of integration the most satisfactory option. (Sam and Berry, 2016).

El Hadioui (2011) classifies the options in a different way. He describes how, boys with a Moroccan background from an eminently individualistic culture in the Rif are faced with identity issues. They need to find their way between a matrifocal home culture, a 'feminine' school culture, and a 'masculine' street culture. It often goes well and children can easily alter the role they play when they switch from one circle to another. Werdmölder (2005: 113-115) who has carried out a longitudinal research of a group of marginalised youngsters from Moroccan descent in the Netherlands has proposed the term 'internalized culture conflict' to describe the situation in which second-generation men may find themselves. Those with enough 'personal capital' and who have been brought up in stable families are able to turn the conflict into something positive. Such young Moroccans see the Dutch personal liberty and the opportunities of the multicultural welfare society as a 'party' of sorts. A strikingly high number of Moroccan men do well in sports, politics, arts, journalism, and in literary writing. But, at the other end of the spectrum, some youngsters run the risk of marginalisation. This often goes together with parental negligence, truancy, drug use, poor knowledge of the Dutch language, and other problems.

With these typologies, we have now arrived at a viewpoint that considers multicultural diversity a product of different ethnic or cultural identities. This has the advantage that in this theoretical framework individuals are expected to make their own choices (exercise their agency). Diverse societies produce multiple-layered and mixed forms of identities. Foblets et al. (2004) have devoted an ethnographic study to Moroccan youngsters in Belgium who 'play' in several normative spheres. In a hostile environment, reactive identities emerge in response to discrimination and exclusion. The film *Scarface* (1983) starring Al Pacino shows a classic example of an individual who opts for a life of crime. It is about a Cuban immigrant who takes over a drug cartel and succumbs to greed. Van Hellemont (2015) describes the subculture of criminal gangs of drug dealers and extortionists that developed among Congolese youngsters in the Matongé district of Brussels. This study offers a good example of how, under specific circumstances, youngsters can be brought to choose a new identity and even engage in strife for their own gang myth. A series of American films on drug lords in black ghettos in the U.S., starting with *New Jack City*, served as a source of inspiration.

The problem of terrorism

Shortly after the attacks at Brussels Airport and at a metro station in Brussels on 22 March 2016, Kristel Beyens (2016) described the frightening effects of terrorism itself and the authorities' response to it in the Belgian criminology journal *Panopticon*. It is unclear what the underlying causes of the violence were and whether state interventions are proportional and effective or perhaps counter-productive, but one thing became clear: Public life came to a halt and this had also disrupted the basic tenets of a multicultural society. There is no room for relativism of any sort in formulating an analysis. The notion that we are statistically more likely to die an unnatural death in an accident at home or in traffic than as a victim of terrorism holds no credence. On a psychic level, it is frightening to know that this can happen again. Beyens calls this a risk type the *known unknowns*. The disruptive and polarising effect resonates with the uncertainties of life in a modern risk society.

Compared to the rest of Western Europe, Belgium was heavily hit by terrorist attacks, particularly in 2016 (Zaventem, Maalbeek). This immediately attracted academic attention (Coolsaet 2017a, 2017b, Ponsaers 2017, Van San 2017) and Belgian criminology played a prominent role. Criminologists identified a clear link between *ordinary* crime and terrorism. A series of European studies shows that more than 60% of the radicalised youngsters or foreign fighters who left to join the caliphate in Syria had a criminal record at home. It is, once again, typically a problem of second-generation immigrants.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and in Washington in 2001 led to feverish efforts throughout academia to discern the motivation of the terrorists (Coolsaet, 2011). It is true that there are also other forms of violent extremism, but from that moment on, more attention was focused on Islamic terrorism. Since there is so little consensus about exactly what terrorism is, and its manifestations seem to constantly alter their form and contents, conducting research is not simple. Studies have focused on the root causes of terrorism. Efforts are made to examine whether it is Islam itself that incites terrorism. One of the first findings was that the people who engage in terrorist attacks tend to be home-grown and are not necessarily foreigners from abroad. There is more reason to look for the causes in their own (Belgian) surroundings than in international political developments. Assumptions are made about a process of radicalisation always preceding acts of terrorism. The motivations of the perpetrators are analysed and the activities of recruiters are inspected. Pathways that lead youngsters towards violence are distinguished. Subcultures of like-minded jihadist youngsters characterised as being fascinated with death are described. Studies reveal an overlap with ordinary criminality in the lives of the youngsters. The psychology of lone-actor terrorists is analysed. The role of the social media is addressed, enabling youngsters to be inspired by ISIS. The pattern of foreign fighters leaving for the Middle East is

examined. The selection of potential targets for attacks is recorded. The data are incorporated into comprehensive models (Schmid, 2011).

Since there are so few terrorists, it is difficult to formulate academically tenable statements about the phenomenon. Every time a perpetrator profile is proposed, far too many people match the description, without necessarily ending up as terrorists. This is why the predictive value of the proposed profiles is so limited. Up to now, there is no convincing answer to the question of why some countries witness so many attacks and others so few. Why did so many youngsters leave Belgium for Syria and Iraq? And in Belgium itself, who would expect to find a terrorist cell in a town like Verviers? Poor socio-economic conditions, which usually come to mind first in Belgium, are not so decisive after all. Vidino et al. (2017: 17) examine the extensively documented biographies of sixty-five terrorists and conclude that the group is extremely heterogeneous. It remains unclear as to why certain towns are unexpectedly home to clusters of radicalism. In this sense, Hildesheim in Germany bears a resemblance to Verviers and the towns of Lunel in France and Ravenna in Italy. Centres like this develop around charismatic individuals, tight-knit groups and already existing structures. According to these authors, these hubs of radicalisation are more relevant than the social conditions under which the youngsters grew up. I have also often read that these hubs in Belgium are located along the traffic routes between Morocco and Northern Europe.

In 2015, Europol concluded that religion may not be the initial or primary drive behind the radicalisation process, but merely offers a window of opportunity to overcome personal issues. Youngsters feel that committing a terrorist attack in their own country can transform them from *zero* to *hero* (Coolsaet 2017: 227). Olivier Roy believes that only individual trajectories lead to terrorism and that entire communities are not radicalised. This seems to be the latest insight. He expands on it by stating that a radicalisation process can precede surrendering to the jihadist version of Islam, instead of the other way around (Roy 2017). The above-mentioned crime-terror nexus in the career of many terrorists (Basra and Neuman 2016) makes this notion even more plausible.

This labyrinth of ideas has produced multifarious terrorism experts, profilers and specialists in de-radicalising. Professionals close to the group where radicalisation is anticipated, such as teachers, youth workers and local police officers, are trained to recognise signs of extremism. The criminal justice system is prepared for early intervention, IS enthusiasts returning from the Middle East have to appear in court to account for their actions and if they are found guilty, they are confined to separate detention centres. It would be beneficial if these professionals knew which approaches would help to prevent or deter that, but such programs have barely been evaluated.

Once again, there is an insurmountable methodological problem. When is an approach considered successful? If there are no attacks? If enough attacks have been averted? Have radicalised individuals turned away from violence? A program should only be considered successful if it directly ensures that fewer acts of terrorism were thereby committed than might have been without the intervention. How would we ever know? Evaluating the successes of the de-radicalising programmes would require a control group of radicals with nothing in their way. For ethical reasons alone, this would be unfeasible. So for the time being, we are still in the dark. One of the most interesting findings of the Belgian study is that neighbourhoods like Molenbeek are quick to claim that despite the heterogeneity of the Moroccan Belgians, there is no support there for terrorism (Coolsaet 2017). Waves of terrorism eventually die out due to a lack support and approval from the social group of the terrorists (cf. Cronin 2009).

How is the de-radicalisation policy addressed? There is reliable information about two places in Belgium where policies of this kind are designed and structured. Molenbeek is considered the most unruly neighbourhoods of Brussels, and Mechelen presents itself as a town where the problem is under control despite having the highest percentage of Moroccan-Belgians in Belgium. The two are not exactly comparable, if only because of the difference in the size of the Muslim population and stark disparities with respect to social problems like unemployment and poverty, and also because Molenbeek South is a typical transit area for immigrants, whereas the Muslims of Mechelen have basically settled there for good. But there are similarities. All across the country, the policies in place for pre-emption and prevention of terrorism come under separate policy fields and under the aegis of different ministries. So a common difficulty is always that those who implement the policy have to start locally to build up mutual trust. What difficulties have to be surmounted in these two districts?

Combating terrorism in Molenbeek is challenged by the shortcomings of the organization of the administration. The 22/03 Parliamentary Commission on the terror attacks laid the blame on the complexity of the security administration in the Brussels Capital Region. Devroe and Ponsaers (2017) demonstrate how unusually complicated it is to run this district. In another publication, they explain why plans made at higher political levels simply do not reach the local level (Ponsaers and Devroe 2016). No less than six separate police forces are tasked with the maintenance of law and order in Brussels. The size of the police force in Molenbeek, by far the most problematic district, is the smallest of the six. It is the least popular district among police officers, and instead of investing in lasting contacts with the residents there, police officers generally hope to be working elsewhere in a few years. The extra police force assigned to cope with the threat of terrorism consists of no more than fifty police officers from other forces who only show up in the event of acute danger. It is always difficult to effect consultations among the various allied parties, such as between social workers,

the neighbourhood police officers and members of the security services, because none of them is keen to violate their confidentiality obligation. Local consultations with the community are extremely problematic for the simple reason that the community of residents with a Moroccan background do not constitute a regular actor in the political process.

After the terrorist attacks, the police and security forces, as well as the public at large, wondered why those who could have seen this coming, namely, the perpetrators' relatives, neighbours and classmates, had not approached the authorities earlier. One can only assume that perhaps it was a matter of honour, maybe the Muslims are weary of constantly being associated with crimes they have not committed. Maybe it was because the closest relatives could not imagine anything like this happening. In retrospect, however, often the signs were there. In the context of Molenbeek, Johan Leman (2017), an anthropologist who spent years living among the Muslims there, presents a perspective that makes matters clearer. Omertà, as he calls it, is linked in part to the solidarity among friends who lead a marginal life. It is even more important though to follow the principle of *loyalty segmentarization* characteristic of a tribal society (e.g., in the Rif Mountains), which after all offers a cultural explanation. According to this principle, depending on the problem, people turn to a higher or lower authority within the tribal framework. It refers to the solidarity of the nuclear familiar versus the extended family, families from one lineage or village versus other lineages or villages, people from the Rif Mountains or the Berbers versus Arab Morocco, Muslims versus other religions or beliefs. In Leman's view, remaining silent and refusing to talk to the authorities does not automatically connote approval of the behaviour of extremists, but it is group solidarity that wins in the end.

Alexander van Leuven (2017), who is responsible for the de-radicalisation policy in Mechelen, writes that the authorities in his town had been vigilant and responded by immediately deporting the Jihad recruiters. The Moroccan social fabric was subsequently activated. It is not clear why it worked in this case, and not in other towns and neighbourhoods with large Moroccan populations. It may be a matter of community size and the fortunate combination of a relatively high level of solidarity and responsible leadership, for the Mayor of Mechelen is popular there for his inclusive politics.

A great deal of attention is now being devoted to the study of terrorism and radicalisation. General assumptions, e.g., that socio-economic disadvantages were the root cause, have in the interim period more or less been refuted than confirmed. Perhaps the entire concept of radicalisation is unscientific in its unpredictability and is essentially not that useful. We still have no idea how best to combat terrorism. Is there any proof of the effectiveness of de-radicalisation courses, programmes providing a counter-narrative, more intensive community policing? The question as to why Belgium is so haunted by terrorism has also failed to be adequately answered.

Selectivity in the conduct of the police and courts

Belgian criminology has produced ample studies that demonstrate without exception that minorities are systematically treated worse than the majority population (Bovenkerk 2014: 163). The reactions of the authorities themselves are thus contributing to the severity of the problem. People of colour are more apt to be stopped and arrested by the police, foreigners are systematically more often kept in temporary custody and on average, members of ethnic minorities with similar criminal records are given longer prison sentences for the same offences than the native population. The cumulative causation of discrimination in every stage of decision-making adds up to a sizable disadvantage. Belgium does not differ from the rest of Western Europe in this respect.

Inequality before the law is a high priority on the research agenda all over, and in Europe, excellent studies demonstrate the effects of discrimination (see for France, Pager 2010 and for the Netherlands, the research report on inequality in courtroom sentencing by Wermink et al. 2017). To combat this inequality, more uniform criteria for sentencing are recommended, be that even at the expense of the judges' decision-making discretion (see for Belgium, D'Hondt 2004). Separate cultural sensitivity courses for judges are also recommended. And yet, the results have been unclear. A course might open their eyes to the suspects' backgrounds, but could also easily lean towards a typically orientalist exercise in which deviant behaviour is interpreted as a function of an exotic custom.

In proactive police work, ethnic profiling can be defined as a tendency to disproportionately stop and search people based on their visible ethnic or racial features with no reasonable justification. In addition, the police tend to be unnecessarily rough. This has been observed virtually all across Western Europe, and the objections are similarly ubiquitous. In particular, picking up ethnic minority members for a routine check is perceived as intimidating. In 1991, this incited the outbreak of riots in Vorst and St. Gilles in the Brussels area. In Belgium, researchers from Ghent have followed the work of the police in this connection and concluded that the state of the relations between the police and the ethnic minority youth is dismal (Easton et al. 2009). According to many researchers, the prevailing police culture has given rise to selective stop-and-search practices based on ethnic profiling. During their training, police officers informally exchange information on which minority groups are most likely to be in the possession of drugs, arms or stolen property. This selection is based on stereotypes rather than on scientific empirical research.

Police work is always selective, and in these neighbourhoods the intervention of police officers, who are often young and have cultivated no special ties with the district, feel nonetheless they know exactly what the young men – who they are expected to stop – look like. Much more thought needs to be put into community

policing, with police officers who invest time and energy in building a relationship with the local residents. The higher ups in the police as well as in the political hierarchy implicitly go along with the practice of ethnic profiling, which makes it difficult to monitor them from the outside. Comité P, the agency that supervises the police in Brussels, does not receive many complaints, which can be explained by a general unwillingness to air grievances in the first place. Recently, the police forces of two Flemish municipalities allowed other researchers from the University of Ghent to accompany them in police cars during police patrols in the said areas, in order to observe police interaction with the public (Van Damme 2017). Their study constitutes a test of the theory of procedural fairness. The strongest predictor of citizens' cooperation with and respect for police work is the willingness of law enforcement to adhere to an ethical code of conduct.

So much research has since been conducted in Europe on police conduct and so many remedies have been tried out to eliminate ethnic profiling that we are well aware of what works and what does not (see e.g., Kleijer-Kool, 2013). It is pointless, for example, to punish individual police officers citing racism. What we are looking at is a structural problem. Maintaining procedural fairness is a first step towards solving the problem. Effective police work is based on cooperation with the local population. Prospective police officers should learn that the natural police instinct to *catch the bad guys* should not mean chasing minority suspects. A diverse personnel policy is required.

How can the justice system bias be overcome by a policy of affirmative action? Conventional wisdom holds that, in general, people need to be persuaded to change their conduct. According to this line of reasoning, attitude change precedes behavioural change. In this case, a training course on multicultural society would indeed be pertinent. However, the social psychology theory of intergroup contact predicts precisely the opposite (Pettigrew and Trapp 2011): Behavioural change is often the precursor of attitude change. This mechanism works under the following four conditions. (1) Minority groups need to be granted equal status (recruits with an immigration background should not solely be hired for the simplest jobs). (2) They work toward common goals (combating crime or preventing terrorism). (3) These efforts have the support of the authorities and the law (it only works in hierarchic organisations like a police force if the people in charge all the way up to the cabinet ministers support the policy).

There are numerous advantages of affirmative action to neutralize justice system bias in police and justice departments. It can be an eye-opener for police officers or district attorneys to work side by side as equals with colleagues whose ethnic background is the same as that of the community over which they have oversight and whose members they encounter on the streets or come face to face in the courtroom as suspects on a daily basis. This gives them an opportunity to acquire cultural expertise that can help them evaluate the conduct of perpetrators and

victims. Janssens and Ferez (2015) note that diversity is not yet a subject taught at police academies in Belgium. Successful police officers, district attorneys and judges of ethnic minority descent can serve as role models for the entire group. The symbolic significance should not be underestimated. The administration of criminal justice is not based on the privilege of one ethnic group to judge another.

I have tried to find out how many individuals with an ethnic minority background are now employed at the police and justice departments in Flanders. In this regard, the police of Antwerp was kind enough to provide me with the information they had. In an administrative agreement (*bestuursakkoord* 2013-2019) on personnel management, the administration took steps to attain 'a personnel composition that mirrors the active age population of our city'. Such a policy needs data on ethnicity which are provided by the 'Datawarehouse of the Kruispuntbank Social Security'. The percentage of people with a migration background working for the police is 8.4%. There is no information as to which ethnic background they have and we do not know how many are actually patrolling the streets in 'intervention squads'. I have no data on other Belgium or Flemish police forces. The number of magistrates is easier to ascertain. According to the Procuror-General, there are no more than 3 (three) judges with a visible immigrant background.

These figures show that colleagues with a visible immigration background are no more than an exotic minority within the departments. That is not enough to bring about any real change. A tipping point of at least 15% is generally assumed for a successful multicultural personnel policy, which is far from easy. On the other hand, such policy is now standard practice in many advanced multicultural countries and lessons can be learned from them.

Conclusion

This paper argues that strategic and theoretically founded data collection on ethnicity and delinquency is essential and beneficial to the community. In the course of the previous years, we may have been sensitised in the opposite direction: data on ethnicity could only work against the minorities, used to spike discriminatory practices against them and prevent their integration into society. However, data helps to combat the socio-ethnic disadvantage of the minorities, which is a real social problem and should be addressed. The same holds true for discrimination in the areas of work, housing and education. There are serious problems of second-generation delinquency in some groups that represent a challenge for the police force, especially those operating in the inner-city areas. Evidence proving that political and religious radicalisation and terrorism are intertwined with criminality should also give pause for thought to politicians and policy makers. It is essential to understand the subcultures and attitudes of new generations of youngsters in order to adequately deal with them. Therefore the necessity of gathering data and doing research in this area can no longer be questioned. The question is not

whether data must be collected, but for what reasons, so that our attention must be diverted to the question of to what end data is being or must be put to use.

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